

Undermining Democratic Country Ownership: Embedding northern development agendas through technical cooperation?

The 2015 *Addis Ababa Agenda for Action* (AAAA) establishes holistic and forward-looking framework to bring together the financial means to implement Agenda 2030, an ambitious universal set of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) for development progress that intends to leave no one behind. Official Development Assistance (ODA) is an essential pillar for this framework, whose resources are to focus on the development needs of the poorest populations and countries.

The AAAA emphasizes the importance of “continued efforts to improve the quality, impact and effectiveness of development cooperation and other international efforts in public finance, including adherence to agreed development cooperation effectiveness principles.” (§58) Central to these principles is democratic country ownership, a focus on results closely linked to partner country priorities, and untying aid from donor country economic interests.

Technical assistance (TA), technical cooperation (TC) and capacity development have had a long and controversial history as a means for delivering development change through aid. Technical cooperation, whether through training programs, capacity building, or provision of donor-recruited technical expertise, is seen to be crucial in delivering Agenda 2030. The AAAA cites technical assistance in efforts to increase domestic resource mobilization in developing countries (§28), to build capacities at the local level (§34), promote micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (§43), implement investment promotion regimes for low income countries (§46), implement infrastructure plans (§47), and to foster aid for trade capacities (§90).

In the 2016 Reality of Aid Report civil society analysts draw from a range of country case studies focusing on the continued scale and use of technical cooperation to drive donor agendas in development cooperation. How “fit for purpose” is technical cooperation for achieving the goals of Agenda 2030? Is the provision of TC taking account important development effectiveness principles agree by all development actors over the past decade? Several contributions critique technical cooperation within a human rights and development effectiveness framework, and this overview chapter draws some lessons and conclusions based on this critique.

1. Shifting views of technical assistance in donor discourse

A focus on TA by donors dates from an era spanning the 1970s through the 1990s. In this period, donors emphasized provision of personnel with skills, know-how and advice, primarily from their donor country. Widespread gaps in basic management and skills capacities in many developing countries, particularly in the poorest post-colonial new states, were seen to be major barriers to development progress.

In this era, bilateral donors extensively employed TA to prepare and implement development projects to ensure that donor-determined outcomes in service delivery or infrastructure projects were realized. At the multilateral level, TA was a key resource, alongside policy conditionality,

deployed by the World Bank to embed neo-liberal structural adjustment programs in the 1980s and 1990s across a wide range of developing countries.

In the past twenty years, notions of development and the means to achieve progress have changed – with a greater emphasis on cooperation for poverty reduction, assuring ‘country ownership’ of development priorities, stressing local participation and good governance as critical conditions for sustainable outcomes, and deepening south-south and triangular exchanges for more relevant skills transfers and learning. Technical assistance has morphed into “technical cooperation,” with a much greater emphasis on training and entrenching skills transfers. The focus is on capacity development through which developing country actors manage their own development priorities.

According to the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC),

“Technical co-operation (also referred to as technical assistance) is the provision of know-how in the form of personnel, training, research and associated costs. ... It comprises donor-financed:

- “Activities that augment the level of knowledge, skills, technical knowhow or productive aptitudes of people in developing countries; and
- “Services such as consultancies, technical support or the provision of know-how that contribute to the execution of a capital project.”¹

In the 2000s, following the 2005 *Paris Declaration for Aid Effectiveness*,² the provision of technical assistance became closely related to “capacity development:”

“Capacity development is the responsibility of partner countries with donors playing a support role. It needs not only to be based on sound technical analysis, but also to be responsive to the broader social, political and economic environment, including the need to strengthen human resources.” [§22]

Donors committed in Paris to “align their analytic and financial support with partners’ capacity development objectives and strategies, make effective use of existing capacities and harmonise support for capacity development accordingly.” [§24] In 2006, the DAC published an important guidance, *The Challenge of Capacity Development, Working towards good practice*, reviewing lessons from technical cooperation and various forms of capacity development over 40 years of donor experience.³ Much of this advice is as relevant today as it has been over these 4 decades.

Taking up these lessons in Accra in 2008, donors agreed that their “support for capacity development will be demand-driven and designed to support country ownership.” [*Accra Agenda for Action*]⁴ (AAA), §14] Together with partner country governments they committed in the AAA to

- “i) Jointly select and manage technical co-operation, and
- ii) Promote the provision of technical co-operation by local and regional resources, including through South-South co-operation.” [§14b]

Inexplicably, however, after 2010, donor commitments to reform relating to technical assistance / capacity development have become largely invisible in donor discourse on effective development cooperation. The 2011 *Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation*, despite taking on the Paris Declaration commitments, mentions capacity development only in passing – as a factor in the donor commitment to use partner country institution and procurement systems in aid provision. There is no reference to demand-driven technical assistance or cooperation.


Yet technical cooperation remains a key resource in ODA and potentially in the achievement of the different Sustainable Development Goals over the next 15 years.

2. The scale of technical assistance in aid allocation

In 2014, the DAC recorded a total of US\$19.5 billion in free-standing technical cooperation (TC), which made up 14% of Real ODA (ODA less debt cancellation, imputed students and refugees expenses in donor countries). As a percentage of Real ODA, Chart One indicates a sharp decline in TA from 27% after 2005. Since 2005, ODA increased (see the Aid Trends chapter in this Report), but these increases seemingly have not been allocated to free-standing technical cooperation.

OECD DAC statistics only tracks “free-standing technical cooperation” – provision of expertise for training or skills transfer (capacity development) initiatives. They therefore under-estimate total TC as DAC donors and multilateral institutions do not report on donor-provided expertise within projects (assisting in the preparing and technical implementation of these projects).

Chart One: Technical Cooperation as a Percentage to Real ODA



Technical cooperation delivered through multilateral institutions, primarily the International Development Association window of the World Bank, has also declined as a share of total TC. In 1980 multilateral TC made up 27% of TC, but only 11% in 2014.

The primary providers of TC are bilateral donors – and three in particular, according to DAC statistics. In 2014, Germany, France and Japan, among the top five DAC donors, allocated 54%, 41% and 33%, respectively, of their real bilateral assistance through TC (compared to an average of 18% for all bilateral donors).⁵ When excluding the United States (see footnote 5 for an explanation), TC still made up at least 25% of total real bilateral aid for DAC donors in 2014. It is a crucial resource that remains largely unanalyzed in terms of development effectiveness.⁶

3. Modalities and roles of technical cooperation in ODA

Official statistics reveal little about the forms of technical cooperation, which can range from university research, long-term foreign experts placed in developing country ministries, co-operant exchanges organized by CSOs, training courses, or short-term consultants on particular assignments.⁷

While the forms and emphasis in technical cooperation has varied across the decades, its stated rationale has consistently centred on filling largely donor-perceived gaps in skills and/or institutional competence to more effectively deliver development outcomes. As already noted, following the 2005 *Paris Declaration's* emphasis on “aid effectiveness,” donors were to be guided by “demand-driven” TC, where they responded to gaps and institutional needs explicitly identified by developing country partners. In this policy context, TC was to focus capacity development in order to strengthen partner country ownership of development priorities and domestic skills to ensure country-determined development outcomes. But what was the reality?

The case studies in this Report identify a number of substantive roles for TC, which have been consistent in donor practices over these decades.

- Embedding donor technical assistants (TAs) in government ministries to develop specific capacities and/or improve the technical standards for institutional processes (such as procurement or tax policies).
- Embedding donor TAs within projects to provide needed technical skills to design and build infrastructure.
- Providing policy advice, often accompanying World Bank loan conditions or WTO or regional trade agreements.
- Providing advice to influence government legislation and regulations in areas seen (by donors) to be critical for development progress.
- Sharing experiences through South-South Cooperation (SSC) and/or civil society networks drawing on appropriate expertise from similar development conditions and realities.

The scale of these different TA roles, relative to total TC disbursements, is difficult to measure, given an absence of data and information for many projects and undertakings. Nevertheless CSO authors in this Report have been able to assess the impact of TC through country case studies. Their reference point is not just effective delivery of technical projects, but also people-centred development paradigms, where peoples' interests and voice are able to shape government and civil society development initiatives.

Reality of Aid⁸ asked authors to address a number of questions, linking current trends in the deployment of technical cooperation to commitments to implement the Busan principles for effective development cooperation – focusing on strengthening space and opportunities democratic country ownership:

- Is technical cooperation limiting policy space for developing countries to freely choose and implement policies to enable development strategies?
- Is technical cooperation being employed as a “soft form” of policy conditionality?
- What approaches on the part of aid providers will enable the provision of technical cooperation consistent with country ownership?
- How can the recipients of technical cooperation create conditions for developing countries to manage technical cooperation in their own interest?

The country case studies highlights the continued *political* role of TC within aid and development cooperation, one that largely promote particular donor inspired paradigms for governance, export-led development, and private sector partnerships that undermine peoples' right.

4. Trends and issues in the deployment of technical cooperation

By 2005 academic studies and institutional evaluations had documented a growing consensus, even among aid providers, that traditional TA, as implemented over previous decades, had largely failed to deliver sustained change. In a damning critique, Roger Riddell noted a 2005 World Bank conclusion for Africa:

“More generally, a major ten-year review of the World Bank’s efforts at supporting capacity building in Africa ... makes grim reading. Acknowledging the weaknesses and ineffectiveness of traditional approaches to capacity development, the Bank admits that its attempt to focus more directly on helping to strengthen public institutions in Africa continues to be a huge challenge, and that in its more recent efforts, a range of key weaknesses remain. ... Capacity development efforts remain insufficiently led by the recipient countries, and based on insufficient knowledge about precisely what to do and how to do it.”⁹

According to case studies in this Reality of Aid Report, this overall assessment is as applicable today as it was ten years ago, despite the attention to “capacity development” in more recent times. The Bangladesh chapter concludes that “country ownership, alignment and effectiveness is largely absent” in TA aid for Bangladesh to strengthen the performance and capacity of public

institutions and public procurement. The Uganda case study similarly highlights examples of TA largely not aligned with the national development strategies and the strengthening of national systems, despite aid providers' affirmation of country ownership as a guiding principle for aid effectiveness in Uganda.

Reality of Aid authors identify three core critical issues in the purposes and delivery of technical cooperation by aid providers, which undermine country ownership and the implementation of the 2011 Busan principles for effective development cooperation.^a

a) Safeguarding donor interests to realize specific donor results and avoid risk in aid delivery, irrespective of the needs of partner country counterparts.

For many recipient countries, TA remains largely supply-driven, designed to meet donors' interests. In particular, donors employ TA to manage and safeguard the deployment of aid in ways that ensure implementation of donor cooperation objectives. Donors' pre-occupation with achieving short-term results increasingly drives aid priorities in the context of political challenges to aid as an effective resource in the donor countries. Selected by donors, TA experts and consultants are accountable and reporting to donors to maintain control and deliver these results (in the case of consultants through contractual obligations), rather than address often more complex capacity needs and interests of partner country counterparts.

Where developing country capacities are perceived to be weak, donors respond to a "risky environment" and a lack of trust in the partnership relationship. Effective measures in development cooperation to improve domestic capacities in government and related institutions take deliberate effort to engage and assess the sources of limited capacity, unpredictable time and iterative approaches, and encouragement through increasing donor use of these country systems (accepting some level of risk). But rather than act on their Busan commitment to support recipient-determined capacity development programs through skills development and improve the use of recipient systems, donor practices in aid delivery remain motivated by avoidance of risk in the short term.

In the Bangladesh case study, for example, the World Bank supported a multi-year program of to improve the national procurement system. Yet as the author points out, donors continue to insist on using donor-determined procurement rules and mechanisms, over the reformed national system. This practice persists even though the World Bank, working with donors and the Bangladeshi government, successfully supported a new law and Bangladeshi capacities to implement this reformed system.

^a These Busan principles for effective development cooperation are 1) ownership of development priorities by developing countries; 2) Focus on results (and on enhancing developing countries capacities, aligned with the priorities and policies set out by developing countries themselves); 3) Inclusive development partnerships (recognizing the complementary roles of all development actors); and 4) Transparency and accountability to each other. [S11]

b) Promoting, designing and implementing public private partnerships (PPPs), ignore peoples' priorities, interests and alternatives.

The case studies (Philippines, Sri Lanka, Kyrgyz Republic, India and Japan) document the widespread use of foreign technical assistance in designing and implementing infrastructure PPPs. The emphasis has been on donor-driven technical advice, sometimes over decades, to promote privatization of public services – roads in the Philippines, export-oriented agriculture in Sri Lanka, or access and exploitation of natural resources in North East India.

The Sri Lankan case illustrates the critical role played by TAs, recruited and supported by the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, in designing not only technical aspects of irrigation projects, but also in proposing and carrying out politically motivated reforms to privatize access to water over a 20 year period. To this day, the World Bank continues to provide advice and support towards an export-oriented agriculture strategy, ignoring issues of food production to address local food security.

In the case of NE India, the Asia Development Bank (ADB), alongside other donors, aggressively promoted private sector engagement in large-scale agriculture, developing energy sources and forest exploitation. In the words of the author, “the prioritization of road projects are in areas with potential to connect trading points for business interests of multinational corporation or where there are natural resources, water, oil, and forest resources for exploitation for their profit.” The needs of communities are neglected in these plans, “where most of the roads continue to be in dilapidated condition.” TA has been embedded in multiple stages of infrastructural projects in the region since the 1990s.

Donor support for infrastructural development has often politically marginalized affected populations. In the case of NE India, ADB guidance for TAs ignored issues related to indigenous peoples' rights over land and economy, and failed to implement the free, prior and informed consent of indigenous peoples affected by infrastructure development. The Sri Lankan case study documents the successful resistance of farmers to repeated schemes for the privatization of water in various irrigation schemes promoted by TA experts and government officials. The Philippines case study of TA in support of the Laguna-Lakeshore Expressway-Dike PPP highlights the so-far successful resistance of those who will be displaced to this development in the context of documented serious ecological concerns.

In all these cases, PPPs do not promote inclusive partnerships, nor do they bring on board alternative technical advice and proposals from nationals familiar with the conditions of affected local populations and communities were ignored or deliberately marginalized.

c) Shaping national development priorities through legislation and governance reform.

A little technical assistance through aid can go a long way in creating an open legal environment for exploitation of natural resources. Canada, for example, has an explicit policy to provide technical assistance for the promotion of “sustainable development in the area of minerals and metals,” including shaping laws governing mines and their development.¹⁰ In Honduras, for

example, Canadian aid assisted in the drafting and passage of new mining legislation, which social and environmental organizations continue to resist on grounds that it is unconstitutional and fails to prohibit ecologically destructive open-pit extraction. They claim,

“It marginalized mining-affected communities, grassroots organizations, and environmental NGOs from being effectively heard in the process of developing the law and did not follow the legislator’s own protocol for debate and ratification of the General Mining Law. They also allege that over 20 articles in the mining law violate Honduran laws and constitution, as well as international treaties ratified by the Honduran state.”¹¹

Similar instances of donor influence through TA in the legal and regulatory process, with an aim often to promote a privatization agenda, are noted in the cases of the Philippines (governing PPPs) and Sri Lanka (governing irrigation and governance of water resources). In these and other cases, TAs are often embedded in related government ministries and institutions.

Euodad, in its case study, details the use of technical assistance to update national legislation and regulations on taxation and to support audits on taxes owed by multinational corporations, in order to strengthen domestic revenue mobilization in developing countries. Through an OECD project, Tax Inspectors without Borders, TAs from industrialized countries in which these MNCs are often based, train tax administrators in developing countries in MNC audit procedures and related issues. Eurodad documents several case studies that clearly suggest that such TC is supply driven by donor countries. There was little or no involvement of the developing country domestic revenue authorities, and these TAs faced significant potential for conflicts of interest, coming from northern countries in which there are substantial loopholes for MNCs to avoid taxation (e.g. the Netherlands). They quote the High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa:

“It is somewhat contradictory for developed countries to continue to provide technical assistance and development aid (though at lower levels) to Africa, while at the same time maintaining tax rules that enable the bleeding of the continent’s resources through illicit financial flows.”¹²

These practices raise significant questions on transparency (with TAs working to influence national political processes through legislation) and processes of accountability to people and communities affected by national legislation and governance bodies.

5. Technical cooperation in South-South Cooperation (SSC)

While difficult to measure, technical assistance plays a major role in SSC, particularly SSC providers such as Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and India. For example, VANI’s chapter draws attention to more than 8,000 Indian TAs in 2014/15 offered to 160 countries in a variety of disciplines, but with the majority supporting cooperation with India’s immediate neighbours, such as Bhutan. A review of Argentina’s SSC in this Report identifies the importance of mutual benefit and shared interests in SSC in areas such as governability, agro-industrial and service sectors, and human rights (truth, justice and reparations).

Civil society also carry out programs in people to people exchanges across developing countries to share skills and experiences with counterpart CSOs at community level and to strengthen solidarity across borders (People4Change and Fortalezas case studies). Authors acknowledge that South-South exchanges can face some similar challenges to North/South exchanges such as cultural misunderstanding and sustainability. But an evaluation of People4Change noted they can also produce the highest benefits, providing not only highly relevant skills based on similar development challenges, but also inspiration at the local level in the realization that these challenges can be overcome. In the case of Fortalezas,

“The bilateral exchanges were critical in sharing the value of different practices of other institutions. ... They allowed for unexpected benefits as organizations discovered interesting methodologies used by their peer organizations, and were able to use and adapt them to their own environments and development plans.”

These positive initiatives in technical cooperation among multiple actors suggest some positive directions for considering how technical cooperation might be reformed to truly contribute to people-centered development outcomes, consistent with the principles for effective development cooperation.

6. Recommendations

With technical cooperation comprising up to 25% of real bilateral aid (and more for select donors), aid providers and partner countries must ensure its effectiveness as an aid modality and its consistency with the Busan principles for effective development cooperation.¹³

a) Democratic country ownership

- **Developing country management of technical assistance** A key determinant of effective technical assistance is a clear orientation by all aid actors in support of demand-led capacity development, with developing country management of the priorities and deployment of TAs, according to country development strategies and priorities.
- **Avoid TC as “soft conditionality”** Technical cooperation is a means to an end, i.e. sustainable capacity development to enable full country ownership and policy space for democratically determined development alternatives. TA is not a convenient and informal mechanism to promote and embed donor/World Bank conditions for financial assistance.
- **Deploy regional and national expertise** Providers should give priority to supporting country and regional efforts to share local expertise to build needed capacities, including collaboration in triangular and South-South Cooperation.
- **Provider focus TC on skills and knowledge transfers** Providers should develop internal training programs for potential TAs, in which technical expertise, sensitivity to local context and process skills are prioritized, with TAs working in advisory roles, not implementation positions. Providers should develop explicit incentives to transfer knowledge and skills, rather than fill gaps and manage risks for short-term donor-

determined aid results. Providers should meet their Paris Declaration commitment to avoid stand-alone project implementation units (PIUs).

- **Dedicated country units to coordinate and manage TAs** Developing countries governments and counterparts should establish and/or enhance dedicated units to:
 - Coordinate country-driven analysis of capacity needs;
 - Negotiate with providers potential technical cooperation interventions (including training and education opportunities) to meet these needs;
 - Exercise leadership in the selection and deployment of TAs; and
 - Monitor and assess lessons in relation to TC support for stronger and sustainable institutional capacities to address complex local development interests.

TA should never be a substitute for apparent reforms required for a sustainable and effective public service.

b) Focus on developing country results

- **Capacities for country-determined results** Technical cooperation should be managed jointly to ensure provider support for results derived from development priorities, plans and policies determined by the country themselves. Effectiveness is highly context specific, with impact and sustainability guided by local stakeholders.
- **Clarity in purpose for TC initiatives** Partner country counterparts should be clear about the purpose of TC in relation to specific capacities and expertise needed to realize country determined priorities and interests.
- **Flexible and iterative TA engagement** Effective TA in a supportive advisory role or in training programs require flexibility to respond to unique and changing realities, particularly in politically sensitive environments.

c) Respecting inclusive partnerships

- **Empowering non-state actors** Technical cooperation should take account the essential importance of empowering non-state actors, such a civil society organizations, who in turn offer a range of technical capacities and knowledge at the national level towards people-centered development outcomes.
- **Implementing human rights norms** Technical cooperation and assistance related to the exploitation of natural resources and/or major infrastructure development should be trained in human rights norms, including techniques to assure free, prior and informed consent by indigenous people, participatory assessment of impacts on communities and affected populations, and deliberate consideration of measures for the empowerment of women and girls in local development.

d) Transparency and accountability

- Providers should be fully transparent about the mandate of TA personnel and their expected contribution to country-determined development outcomes.

- Providers should be transparent about the costs associated with donor-provided TAs, enabling the opportunity for developing country counterparts to explore alternative local, regional or SSC expertise with these resources. Developing country counterparts should never consider TA to be a “free good,” as this notion can only reinforce an aid dependency culture.
- Providers that report to the OECD DAC should report all TC in which the provision of technical assistance has been formally or informally tied to the provision of donor country experts.
- Providers and developing country counterparts must be clear about the lines of accountability for TAs and TC programs, with line accountability to developing country hosts, and strategic accountability for TC, based on an agreed evaluation framework, included in the agenda of inclusive country level mechanisms for mutual accountability.

¹ OECD DAC, Glossary of Key Terms and Concepts, at <http://www.oecd.org/dac/dac-glossary.htm>.

² Paris Declaration, §22, accessed at <http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/parisdeclarationandaccraagendaforaction.htm>.

³ OECD DAC, *The Challenge of Capacity Development, Working towards good practice*, 2006, accessed August 2016 at http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/capacitybuilding/pdf/DAC_paper_final.pdf.

⁴ Accra Agenda for Action, §16, accessed at <http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/parisdeclarationandaccraagendaforaction.htm>.

⁵ In 2014, the UK allocated 16.9% and the United States, 2.8%, of their real bilateral aid to technical cooperation. An unexplained drop in the reported allocations by the US to TC after 2006 has affected the historical trend for technical cooperation. In 2006 the US reported a total of US\$9.3 billion in TC, but only US\$723 million in 2007. Given the scale of US aid, this drop has accentuated the overall drop in reported TC since 2006. As a percentage of real bilateral aid, US TC was 42% in 2005, but only 3.2% in 2008. Excluding the US, in 2014, 18% of real ODA was allocated to TC, rather than 14% as recorded in Chart One.

These calculations for TC are for “stand-alone technical assistance.” They exclude technical assistance provided within an investment project, which is not reported by most donors. These latter expenditures on TC can be crucial, as described in several case studies in this Report (Sri Lanka, India, and the Philippines), and may increase as a focus on infrastructure increases in overall aid allocations.

⁶ The aid trends chapter in this Reality of Aid Report provides additional information on the allocation of TC. In 2014, 44% of TC went to Least Developed and Low Income Countries and more than half (51%) was allocated to countries where government revenue was less than \$1500 per capita. In terms of sectors, government and civil society (28%) and education (22%) received the largest share and account for 50% of TC in that year.

⁷ ActionAid International, *Making Technical Assistance Work*, 2006, accessed August 2016 at http://www.actionaid.org/sites/files/actionaid/real_aid_2.pdf. This report is the most comprehensive overview and analysis by an international NGO on the strengths and weaknesses of technical cooperation.

⁸ See Reality of Aid, “The Reality of Aid 2016 Theme Statement: Technical cooperation and capacity development as an aid modality,” December 2015, accessed August 2016 at <http://www.realityofaid.org/2015/11/the-reality-of-aid-2016-report-theme-statement-technical-cooperation-and-capacity-development-as-an-aid-modality/>.

⁹ Riddell, R., *Does Foreign Aid Work?* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, page 209

¹⁰ See <http://www.nrcan.gc.ca/mining-materials/policy/8690#il-d>.

¹¹ Mining Watch Canada, "Honduran organizations fight to have Canadian-backed mining law declared unconstitutional," 26 February, 2015, accessed August 2016 at <http://miningwatch.ca/blog/2015/2/26/honduran-organizations-fight-have-canadian-backed-mining-law-declared>.

¹² UNECA. (2014). Illicit Financial Flows: report of the high level panel on illicit financial flows from Africa http://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/publications/iff_main_report_english.pdf.

¹³ These recommendations were informed by the Reality of Aid chapters and the following documents:

- 1) LenCD, the Learning Network on Capacity Development, "Technical Cooperation: An Introduction," 2010, accessible at <http://www.lencd.org/topic/technical-cooperation-introduction>;
- 2) LenCD, the Learning Network on Capacity Development, "Technical Cooperation: Reviewing the Evidence," 2010, accessible at <http://www.lencd.org/topic/technical-cooperation-reviewing-evidence>;
- 3) Land, T. 2007. Joint Evaluation Study of Provision of Technical Assistance Personnel: What can we learn from promising experiences? (ECDPM Discussion Paper 78). Maastricht: ECDPM, accessible at <http://ecdpm.org/publications/joint-evaluation-study-provision-technical-assistance-personnel/>;
- 4) Governance and Social Development Resource Center, "Helpdesk Research Report: Changing approaches to technical assistance," 2009, accessible at <http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/hd586.pdf>; and
- 5) ActionAid, *Real Aid: Making technical assistance work*, 2006, http://www.actionaid.org/sites/files/actionaid/real_aid_2.pdf.