

ANNEX THREE

DETAILED ANALYSIS OF INDICATOR TWO QUESTIONS

A detailed examination of each Module Question for Indicator Two is based on answers by 44 CSO 3MR countries as well as an additional 10 countries covered by the CPDE Survey. It analyzes trends in relation to the distribution of CSO and Government 3MR-country responses by level of practice for each question, which is provided in detail in **Annex Four**. Readers of this Annex need to crosscheck **Annex Four** for each Question of interest. Reference is made to responses by Development Partners, but these were for a much smaller sample of 3MR countries (see **Annex Four**), and are not comparable to the fuller sample for Government and CSOs. Finally, the analysis also brings together related trends from independent data sources (see **Annex Nine**) as a reference point for judging the responses of the three stakeholder groups.

A) MODULE ONE QUESTIONS: SPACE FOR CSO DIALOGUE

Consultations on National Development Policies (Question One)

More than half of the 44 CSO country respondents (53%) reported that there were either no consultations on national development policies (2 countries) or only occasional consultations of insufficient quality (21 countries). By contrast, 74% of Government respondents considered such consultations to be at level 3, frequent with mixed positive quality (20 countries), or level 4, regular and institutionalized with consistent good quality (9 countries).

Nevertheless, CSO country respondents in 15 countries reported that consultations on national development policies are frequent, with some engagement on defining the consultation content with CSOs, and involving a wide number of CSOs (but with unclear selection criteria).

Almost a third (14) of Development Partners (DPs) provided no responses to questions one and two. Of the remaining 30 countries where DPs responded 86% put consultations at level 3 (15 countries) or level 4 (11 countries).

SDG Consultations (Question Two)

Given the importance and global attention to the SDGs and Agenda 2030, a significant number of CSO country respondents (42%) reported that only some selected CSO are consulted occasionally around SDG mainstreaming, implementation and monitoring progress (18 countries), while another 14% reported no consultations on SDGs (6 countries).

Forty-four percent (44%) of CSO country respondents graded consultations on SDGs at levels 3 (a diversity of CSOs being consulted in ad hoc process) or level 4 (an institutionalized SDG process), but somewhat lower than CSO level 3/4 responses for consultations on national development policies (54%) in question one. Ten CSO country respondents placed their country in level 4 for SDG consultations.

By contrast 83% of Government respondents put the frequency and quality of these consultations at level 3 (17 countries), or at level 4 (16 countries), affirming that a diversity of CSOs are being formally consulted in an institutionalized process with consistent good practice. Independent CSO surveys of CSO engagement in Voluntary National Reviews of SDG implementation (see below) do not confirm these positive perceptions by Government (and Development Partners).

Consultations inform government policies and programs (Question Four)

In 24 countries (55%), a small majority of CSO country respondents confirmed that the advice and evidence provided by CSOs through consultations is either occasionally taken into account (level 3) [22 countries] or consistently taken into account (level 4) [2 countries]. But in 19 countries (43%), CSOs reported that only minor comments by CSOs are taken into account.

Governments and Development Partners are consistently much more positive, with 83% and 79% respectively, reporting that advice from CSOs on development policies are taken into account by government either occasionally or consistently.

Indicator Two respondent commentaries for consultations¹

Institutionalization of public consultation is still rare among countries. Albania may be an exception, where the government reported that its law on “notification and public consultation,” “increased awareness of public institutions on fulfilling their legal obligations to provide information, include citizens in their policy, and decision-making processes.” Yet in other countries, CSOs are not consulted at all (Madagascar) or are becoming less regular (Mozambique).

With respect to the SDGs, Benin is country exhibiting good practice: “In 2017 as in 2018, a civil society delegation took part, at the request of the Government and with the financial support of UNDP, in the High-Level Policy Forum on Sustainable Development held in New York.” Inclusion on SDGs is also a good practice in Burkina Faso.

In some countries, CSOs reported good feedback and influence over policy from CSO/Government consultations (Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, partial in Mozambique, Rwanda, partial in Senegal).

There were a significant number of comments that accompanied the questions on consultations pointing to overall poor quality (Cameroon); no institutionalization of the SDG process (Kenya, Madagascar, Togo); no clear criteria by which CSOs are invited or excluded (Albania, Cambodia, Georgia, Malawi); absence of CSO contribution to setting the consultation agenda (Georgia); consultations at only the final policy stages (Kenya, Senegal); little opportunity to provide CSO evidence and data (Dominican Republic); characterized by low levels of CSO trust in government and therefore in consultations and/or CSO capacity constraints (Armenia, Mozambique); and

¹ Note that only a minor of participating countries offered any narrative commentary in addition to their scoring.


governments make no provision for consultation feedback on policy influence (Benin, Cambodia, Dominican Republic, Madagascar).

Independent Data Sources: Survey of consultations for SDG Voluntary National Reviews

In early 2019, Action for Sustainable Development (A4SD) surveyed 135 civil society organizations in 62 countries on their experience with the Agenda 2030 follow-up and review process over the past three years.² This survey explores the commitment made in 2015 for a robust and inclusive review process on the implementation of Agenda 2030 and the SDGs. As such, it provides a good counter-point to the data collected by indicator two on consultations, particularly with regard to country level implementation of the SDGs.

The survey reveals a diversity of civil society experiences in inclusion and in their capacities to engage governments in the Voluntary National Reviews of country-level progress. These results largely confirm CSO responses in the GPEDC's 3MR with regard to consultations.

Chart A3-1 CSO Engagement with Country SDG Voluntary National Reviews



In the survey, 59% of respondents said that there was no opportunity (36%) or little opportunity (23%) to participate in an institutionalized ongoing review mechanism for SDG priorities in their country. (See **Chart A3-1**) A similar 60% had no or little opportunity to contribute independent evidence, assessments or reports based on their organization's development experience. At the

² Action for Sustainable Development, 2019. Survey of the UN 2030 Agenda Follow Up and Review process: Analysis- Towards a more open & inclusive approach, https://action4sd.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/HLPF-survey_Towards-a-more-open-inclusive-approach-to-2030-Agenda-Monitoring.pdf


same time, 66% had a modest to excellent opportunity as a CSO to work with other CSOs on these themes in larger groups or coalitions.

Governments are not only slow to enact their SDG commitments, but also 63% of civil society respondents in the A4SD survey noted “that there was ‘not a focus’ or ‘little focus’ (scores 1 or 2 on the 1-5 scale) on ‘those left behind’, and 65% of respondents saw ‘little’ or ‘no’ opportunity for such groups to engage at the national level.

CSO perceptions of the effectiveness of the Voluntary National Review process at the country level were also very mixed. (See **Chart A3-2**) In all measures of this effectiveness, more than 50% of CSO respondents’ assessments were “not effective” (level 1) or “marginally effective” (level 2). In 80% of the cases there was no funding for stakeholders to participate in official meetings (level 1) or very little funding (level 2). There was little outreach in different languages, limited accessibility for persons with disabilities, and few online platforms for remote participation.

A similar review of VNRs in 44 countries by the CSO Partnership for Effective Development (CPDE) had a similar conclusion: “The VNR implementation framework is yet to effectively integrate and implement principles of effective development cooperation that will ensure meaningful CSO participation.”³

Chart A3-2 Effectiveness of SDG Country Voluntary National Reviews



³ Civil Society Partnership for Effective Development (CPDE), 2018. “Civil Society Reflections on the Voluntary National Review Process and Sustainable Development Goals Implementation, Key Findings and Recommendations,” unpublished.


In a comprehensive 2018 assessment of VNRs submitted to the annual UN High Level Political Forum to review progress in implementing Agenda 2030, on behalf of the Canadian Council for International Cooperation, “only a handful of VNR reports ... included contributions from non-state actors and local governments throughout. VNR reports continue to remain silent on the enabling environment for civil society, and a limited number speak to others challenges that civil society organisations face in contributing to the 2030 Agenda.”⁴

Despite global commitments in 2015, only a minority of governments are engaging their civil society in the determination of SDG priorities and in their implementation.

Independent Data Sources: V-Democracy Indicator on consultations with CSOs

The Swedish V-Dem Institute annually publishes a disaggregated set of datasets on democracy that reflects the complexity of democracy as a system of rule that goes beyond the simple presence of elections. The Institute relies on a team of over 50 social scientists on six continents and more than 3,000 country experts to develop and analyze the data.⁵

Chart A3-3 Are CSOs routinely consulted by policy makers?



V-Dem Database: <https://www.v-dem.net/en/analysis/VariableGraph/>
 CSO consultation (C) (v2cscnsult) Average Experts Responses

⁴ Kindornay, Shannon. (2019). Progressing National SDG Implementation: An independent assessment of the voluntary national review reports submitted to the United Nations High-level Political Forum in 2018. Ottawa: Canadian Council for International Co-operation, accessed at <https://ccic.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/EN%20-%20Full%20Report%20-%20Progressing%20National%20SDGs%20Implementation%20-%202019.pdf>.

⁵ See **Annex Eight** for scoring details for these indicators.

The V-Dem database for 2018 provides informed assessment of consultations with CSOs by policy makers in 72 of the 86 GPEDC monitored countries. (**Chart A3-3**) Of these 72 countries, for more than half (37 countries or 51%) the experts' consensus was that government in these countries did not consult or only to some degree consult CSOs. In the remaining 35 countries CSOs are recognized as important stakeholders in these countries and given voice on policy issues.

Transparency and Access to Information (Question Three)

With regard to access to relevant government information in law and in practice, most CSO and Government respondents agree that laws exist, but that CSOs have a mixed experience in timely access to relevant and comprehensive information needed for consultation (level 3). CSO respondents in 28 countries (64% of CSO respondents) put performance at this acceptable level, while 21 Government respondents (53%) chose this level. Overall, 75% of CSO respondents and 88% of Governments reported performance at either level 3 or level 4 (full access to relevant, comprehensive information, with sufficient time). CSOs were more reluctant to give a level 4 ranking – in only 5 countries compared to 14 for Government.

Indicator Two respondent commentary on transparency⁶

New laws are in place in a number of countries (Albania, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Mozambique), but the degree to which these laws provide open access to relevant information varies significantly by country, by the nature of the documents and sometimes by the CSO requesting information (Benin, Dominican Republic, Georgia, Malawi). In other countries no legal framework exists (Cameroon, Georgia, Madagascar) or a draft law is in progress (Cote D'Ivoire). In Kenya, "the quality of access to information is marred by timeliness of access as well as the expenses involved in obtaining the information."

Independent Data Sources: International Budget Partnership

There is no comparable independent datasets on the degree to which countries have implemented full access to information for the participation of citizens in public consultations. However, the Open Budget Survey, implemented by the International Budget Partnership (IBP), does provide comparative cross-country data on budget transparency, oversight, and participation at the national level, undertaken by rigorous independent research in each country.⁷

There is an IBP 2017 score for the degree to which there is an open budget process in 30 of the 42 countries with common Governments and CSOs responses. The resulting **Table A3.1** indicates considerable variations between the perception of access to information for consultations and the independent assessment of access to budgetary information. While not directly comparable to access to information for consultations, budget transparency is a strong indicator for an enabling

⁶ Note that only a minor of participating countries offered any narrative commentary in addition to their scoring.

⁷ See the Open Budget Survey at <https://www.internationalbudget.org/open-budget-survey/>.

environment in which citizens and CSOs can hold their government to account for the allocation of development resources. As is apparent in **Table A3.1**, there are only 5 countries that scored at a level of substantial or extensive budget information available to the public (budget information is sufficient), while among these 30 countries, in the Monitoring Round, 26 Governments scored access to information at level 3 or level 4 (good or excellent practice), and 23 CSO country respondents did likewise.

Table A3.1: Indicator Two, Access to Information (Module 1, Q3) and Open Budget Score

	Gov't GPEDC Q3 Level	CSO GPEDC Q3 Level	Budget Survey Score	Degree of Access to Budget Information
Niger	3	3	0	Scant or No Information
Yemen	2	2	0	Scant or No Information
Cameroon	4	3	7	Scant or No Information
Nigeria	3	3	17	Scant or No Information
Cambodia	3	3	20	Scant or No Information
Rwanda	3	3	22	Minimal Information
Burkina Faso	4	4	24	Minimal Information
Cote d'Ivoire	4	3	24	Minimal Information
Malawi	2	3	26	Minimal Information
DRC	3	3	29	Minimal Information
Madagascar	3	2	34	Minimal Information
Bosnia & Herzegovina	2	2	35	Minimal Information
Benin	4	3	39	Minimal Information
Mali	4	4	39	Minimal Information
Timor Leste	3	3	40	Minimal Information
Bangladesh	4	3	41	Limited Information
Egypt	3	2	41	Limited Information
Mozambique	3	2	41	Limited Information
Paraguay	3	3	43	Limited Information
Kenya	3	3	46	Limited Information
Albania	4	3	50	Limited Information
PNG	2	2	50	Limited Information
Senegal	3	4	51	Limited Information
Nepal	3	3	52	Limited Information
Moldova	4	4	58	Limited Information
Guatemala	4	3	61	Substantial Information
Dominican Republic	3	3	66	Substantial Information
Philippines	3	2	67	Substantial Information
Peru	3	3	73	Substantial Information
Georgia	3	3	82	Extensive Information

Source: GPEDC Indicator Two, Module One, Question 3, various countries; Open Budget Survey 2017 data by country and consolidated score, <https://www.internationalbudget.org/open-budget-survey/open-budget-index-rankings/>

B) MODULE TWO QUESTIONS: CSO DEVELOPMENT EFFECTIVENESS - ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY


An overview of citizens' participation in 3MR countries

V-Dem indicators on participation in civic organizations

The Swedish V-Dem Institute provides some interesting indicators relating to the broad participation of people in civic organizations. The Institute publishes a disaggregated set of annual datasets on democracy that reflects the complexity of democracy as a system of rule that goes beyond the simple presence of elections.⁸

Among the 72 GPEDC Monitored Countries for which there is data, civic participation is strong (**Chart A3-4**). About half of the countries have a diversity of CSOs, with varying degrees of peoples' participation. In only 8 countries the score indicated that voluntary organizations were non-existent or where participation is very weak.

Chart A3-4 To what degree do people participate in voluntary organizations?




V-Dem Database: <https://www.v-dem.net/en/analysis/VariableGraph/>
CSO participatory environment (C) (v2csprtcpt) Average Experts' Scoring

From a gender perspective, women's participation in civil society is also strong in the majority of GPEDC monitored countries for which there is data (**Chart A3-5**). Women across these 71 countries generally have moderate to high scores for participation in civil society organizations – 26 countries (37%) moderate score and 40 countries (56%) with a high score. There were only five countries where experts considered women experience low levels of civil society participation.

⁸ See **Annex Eight** for scoring details.

Chart A3-5: Women's civic participation index



V-Dem Database: [https://www.v-dem.net/en/analysis/VariableGraph/Women civil society participation index \(D\) \(v2x_gencs\)](https://www.v-dem.net/en/analysis/VariableGraph/Women%20civil%20society%20participation%20index%20(D)%20(v2x_gencs))

Partnerships that are equitable and based on mutual interest (Question One)

The GPEDC 3MR defines equitable partnerships in relation to social solidarity and suggests that such partnerships require deliberate efforts to counter-balance power inequalities between financing CSOs and partner country counterparts, the realities of gender inequities and women's exclusion, and sometimes-large disparities in capacity.⁹

There is strong agreement across many countries that CSOs at the country level do not experience equitable partnerships based on mutual interests with financing CSOs. While Governments are slightly more positive, a majority of CSO country respondents (55%) say that their partnerships are mainly project-based, and are largely designed by financing CSOs (Level 2), or even worse (34%), they experience short-term, one-off, project relationships defined exclusively by the financing CSO programming interests.

⁹ Definition: Equitable CSO partnerships, in all their diversity, are expressions of social solidarity through long-term collaborations based on shared values and mutually agreed goals. Such partnerships are rooted in trust, respect and leadership of partner country CSOs. They require deliberate efforts to counter-balance power inequalities between financing CSOs and partner country counterparts, the realities of gender inequities and women's exclusion, and sometimes-large disparities in capacity. Equitable partnerships are characterized by negotiated programming and shared responsibilities, mutual decision-making and accountability, and processes for addressing any potential conflict. Programming priorities are derived from implementing partners' goals and priorities. [Joint Support Team, Monitoring Framework for Indicator Two, 2018]

Out of 44 countries, only 3 CSO respondents and 4 Government respondents said that most CSOs in their country have long-term partnerships that are the product of negotiations and mutual interests (level 4). An additional 2 countries for CSOs and 9 countries for Government respondents put current practice at Level 3 where CSOs have long-term programmatic partnerships, but the interests of the financing CSOs define the elements of the partnership relationship.

Development Partners in 29 responding countries largely agreed with the perceptions of both CSOs and Government respondents that CSO financing of national/local CSOs is still largely project driven and oriented to programming interests of the former.

Indicator Two respondent commentary on equitable partnerships¹⁰

While partnerships can be defined by contractual agreements in which both partners set out their respective responsibilities, for the most part they are “largely based on projects and project activities in line with call for proposal issued from the financing CSOs” (Albania). A few countries pointed to partnerships that were guided by local CSO priorities and community relationships (Benin). Others suggested that their partnership relationships are varied (Kenya), but are often project-oriented and mainly based on the requirements for fiduciary accountability (Bangladesh, Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya); remain short-term project-based – sometimes due to the funding context (Cambodia, Malawi, Rwanda, Senegal); characterized by limited real negotiation on priorities, terms and conditions due to the inflexibility of financing partners (Mozambique). The development partner-supported Basket Fund for CSOs has been effective in Madagascar in supporting “projects that are intrinsic to CSOs and their empowerment” (Madagascar).

CSO-Initiated coordination to facilitate engagement in policy dialogue (Question Two)

CSO respondents (77%) and Governments (75%) largely agree that CSO-initiated coordination mechanisms exist at the national and sector levels and are sustained by the interests of domestic CSOs, with a strong representation of a large national CSO platform in 25% of the countries responding (Levels 3 and 4). In about one-quarter of the countries CSO coordination remains weak or is largely sustained by the interests of development partners or national governments (Level 2).

The Degree of CSO coordination may also affect the quality of policy dialogue with government. Among the 12 countries that CSOs ranked their coordination as weak (Level 2), in eight (8) of these countries they also observed that policy dialogue with government on development priorities and/or SDG was weak (Level 1 or 2).

¹⁰ Note that only a minor of participating countries offered any narrative commentary in addition to their scoring.

In 30 responding countries, development partners agreed with this assessment of CSO coordination, although in a third of countries they suggested that this coordination was weak and provider/government driven.

Indicator Two respondent commentary on CSO coordination¹¹

In a range of countries, commentators confirm strong and multiple (and sometimes competing) CSO platforms at both national and sectoral levels (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Seychelles, Senegal, Togo). In a few countries there is concern that these platforms are largely driven by provider and/or government interests in an organized interlocutor (Albania); the membership in platforms can be low relative to the numbers of CSOs in the country (Cambodia, Malawi). Weak collaboration is compounded by factors encouraging CSO competition and positioning (Cameroon, Mozambique) and there are issues in resource mobilization for these CSO mechanisms (Kenya).

CSOs development work guided by international human rights standards (Question Three)

There is overall agreement that CSOs generally have policies and programs guided by international human rights standards. Government, Development Partners or CSO respondents said that CSO policies were not generally aligned with these standards in only four or less countries.

There are, however, considerable differences in perceptions about the degree to which these standards influence the actual external and internal practices of CSOs. Almost a third of CSO respondents (32%) and a quarter of Government respondents (26%) put such practices as minimal except among a few large CSOs. A majority of CSOs (64%) and Governments (64%) said that there were either “significant efforts” among some (Level 3) or among most CSOs (Level 4) to institutionalize these policies in actual CSO external and internal practices. Development Partners generally share these perceptions in the 30 countries that responded to the Indicator.

While it is clear that international human rights standards are very much a part of CSO discourse and influence the articulation of policies, there are different perceptions on their implementation in a human rights based approaches (see Annex Three definitions). Unfortunately, there is little evaluative evidence that can document the ways in which CSOs are putting these policies into practice in their day-to-day programming and internal structures and processes.¹²

¹¹ Note that only a minor of participating countries offered any narrative commentary in addition to their scoring.

¹² For a review of human rights based approaches in development practices, see CPDE, *Policy Research on the Implementation of a Human Rights Based Approach in Development Partnerships*, IBON Institute, January 2018, accessed May 2019 at <http://www.csopartnership.org/edc-resources-hrba>. See also David Archer, “Collective Critical Reflections on Using a Human Rights Based Approach in ActionAid,” *Journal of Human Rights Practice*, Volume 9, Issue 2, July 2017, Pages 312–325, <https://doi.org/10.1093/jhuman/hux009>

Indicator Two respondent commentary on international human rights approaches¹³

For many of the commentators, CSOs are implementing human rights standards through their work with marginalized communities and vulnerable people. However, others suggested that the financing priorities of Development Partners and financing CSOs sometimes limit domestic CSOs' orientation towards these groups (Bangladesh, Cameroon); smaller CSOs often do not have the capacity to implement such approaches and are directed by larger CSOs (Madagascar); and that the institutionalization process for many CSOs needs strengthening (Kenya, Mozambique). In Cote d'Ivoire there has been recent training for at least 50 CSO on human rights based approaches in their work, based on the *Istanbul Principles*.

CSO transparency and accountability mechanisms (Question Four)

In more than half the countries, Government respondents (54%) and CSO respondents (52%) observe that there are either no CSO-initiated codes for accountability and transparency (Level 1) or that these accountability mechanisms are still under discussion through a CSO platform (Level 2). Only 5 CSO country respondents (11%) suggest that the accountability mechanism is robust, with a majority of CSOs associated with it, and which certify good practice in the CSO community (Level 4). In 16 countries (36%) CSOs confirm that mechanisms exist for accountability and transparency, but these have no formal procedures to certify adherence (Level 3).

Development Partners are less positive than Government and CSOs, indicating that in 22 of 32 countries where they responded these mechanisms do not exist or are in the process of discussion (Levels 1 and 2).

Indicator Two respondent commentary on CSO accountability¹⁴

A number of countries indicated that no accountability mechanisms implemented by CSOs exists at the moment (Albania, Benin). Others suggested that competition among CSOs has affected the capacity to develop a shared mechanism (Bangladesh); where mechanisms exist, many CSOs do not fully participate (Cambodia); the lack of a national platform limits discussion on shared standards, but there has been some voluntary initiatives by some CSOs (Kenya, Sudan); and different definitions of accountability and mutual accountability is an important consideration (Malawi). As CSOs in Mozambique noted, "CSOs are increasingly aware of the paradox inherent to the fact that they demand government transparency and accountability whilst internally they can hardly ensure those values to their own organizations."

¹³ Note that only a minor of participating countries offered any narrative commentary in addition to their scoring.

¹⁴ Note that only a minor of participating countries offered any narrative commentary in addition to their scoring.

Independent Data Sources: Independent Reviews of CSO Accountability Mechanisms

A recent review of accountability mechanisms for 40 major CSOs and International NGOs (INGOs) associated with the *INGO Accountability Charter*¹⁵ revealed some on-going issues regarding CSO accountability and transparency:

- The main driver for CSO progress in accountability all too often is not CSO institutional interests and initiatives for accountability, but provider/government requirements.
- CSO accountability mechanisms need to be aware of changes in the accountability agenda and adjust reporting mechanisms accordingly.
- Transparency drives accountability, but only a third of the surveyed organizations had an open information policy, and many needed improvements in simplifying and the presentation of information on web sites.

C) MODULE THREE QUESTIONS: OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION WITH CSOs

Development Partners Consulting CSOs (Question One)

For both CSO country respondents (59%) and Governments (51%), in a majority of countries, development partner consultations with CSOs are characterized as occasional and limited, with selected CSOs and focus only on the implementation of provider programs, and not choices for the provider's country program priorities (Levels 1 and 2). In a smaller number of countries (13 for CSOs [30%] and 15 for government [37%]), there are more frequent and coordinated consultations with a diversity of CSOs on a broader range of issues (Levels 3 and 4).

Development Partners are significantly more positive, albeit for a smaller number of countries (30) in which they provided responses. In 12 countries (38%), they consider their consultations to be occasional and limited (Levels 1 and 2), while in 18 countries (62%) they consider their consultation practices to be at a level of good or excellent practice (Levels 3 and 4). However, given the limited sample, these results are not directly comparable to the responses from Governments/CSOs.

Indicator Two respondent commentary on Development Partner consultations¹⁶

While CSOs in a few countries had a positive experience, others pointed to no clear criteria for CSOs participation (Albania); Development Partners set the content for consultation based on their priorities and policies (Albania, Kenya); smaller CSOs experience significant language barriers (Bangladesh); CSOs experience little involvement in the in the preparation/development of

¹⁵ Direct Impact Group, "Survey of the Excellence of CSO Accountability: Developed for the INGO Accountability Charter," 2016, accessed May 2019 at <https://www.direct-impact-group.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Survey-on-the-Excellence-of-CSO-Accountability.pdf>.

¹⁶ Note that only a minor of participating countries offered any narrative commentary in addition to their scoring.

Development Partners' country strategy papers (Benin, Kenya, Mozambique); and little coordination among Development Partners (Cote d'Ivoire). CSOs also sometimes lack coordination in relation to partner consultations (Kenya). In Madagascar, commentators pointed to the success of some Development Partners in harmonising their approaches and support within the framework of a common fund programme to support civil society.

Development Partners promoting an Enabling Environment for CSOs (Question Two)

The perception of CSOs in a majority of the responding countries (55%) is that Development Partners only occasionally include elements of a CSO enabling environment in dialogue with government, often pushed by CSO lobbying on particular issues (level 2). A significant number of Governments (46%) share this view, but a further 44% of Government respondents suggest that most Development Partners include enabling environment in their dialogue with government, but not in a systematic way with follow-up (level 3). For a minority of countries (5 for CSOs and 4 for Governments) this dialogue includes remedial proposals and Development Partners engage with domestic CSOs in a continued monitoring of the enabling environment (level 4).

In the 31 countries in which Development Partners responded, there is a more positive experience with 12 countries (39%) at level 3 and 8 countries at level 4 (26%).

Indicator Two respondent commentary on raising enabling environment issues¹⁷

For Cambodia, Development Partners reported that most of them “include issues of rights that relate to CSO work and the wider enabling environment in their dialogue with government.” This is true in a number of countries, particularly when there are visible threats to civil society, but the involvement of civil society is often low (Cote d'Ivoire, Georgia, Madagascar, Mozambique, Rwanda, Senegal). On the other hand, for the Dominican Republic, CSOs reported “no evidence that issues affecting a civil society are addressed in the policy dialogue between Development Partners and Government and partners usually do not monitor the environment” (also Kenya).

Development partners enabling financial support for CSOs (Question Three)

There is a considerable divergence in perception between Development Partners and CSOs/Governments on the extent to which Development Partner finance is fully enabling for CSOs. In 37 of 44 countries (84%) CSOs stated that Development Partner finance focuses on implementing the latter's priorities, and is sometimes unpredictable and lacks transparency (Level 1 and Level 2). Sixty-three percent (63%) of Government respondents share this view. A minority of Government respondents in only 9 of 41 countries (22%) suggested that Development Partner finance had some emphasis or a major emphasis on CSO-defined priorities (Levels 3 and 4).

¹⁷ Note that only a minor of participating countries offered any narrative commentary in addition to their scoring.

On the other hand, Development Partners, in the 20 of 31 countries (64%) in which they responded placed their practice at levels 3 or 4, in which a diversity of CSOs were enabled through various mechanisms, including support for CSO-defined initiatives and influence over funding priorities.

Indicator Two respondent commentary on financial support for CSOs¹⁸

Many commentators suggested that development partners funding priorities are set at the global level to support their own policies and strategies, with little input from the country level (Albania, Cambodia). Albanian respondents (and others) observed, “Large CSOs including large international CSOs with significant contracting capacities have better access to the funding” (Dominican Republic, Kenya). Other comments included complex and un-transparent criteria in the application procedures (Dominican Republic, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi), difficulties in accessing funds (Senegal), and a limiting focus on short-term goals rather than building long-term capacities and sustainability within CSOs (Mozambique).

Commentators in Madagascar pointed to the importance of the donor basket-fund for financing CSOs, which is disconnected from any bilateral influence of a specific partner and which allows for CSOs in the governance structure to improve accountability.

Independent Data Sources: Macro-trends in CSO financing by DAC development partners

While there are many factors influencing the capacities for national and local CSOs to access DAC Development Partner finance, among these factors are recent trends in the allocation of these finances to CSOs. Three trends should be noted:

a) Most Development Partner finance continues to be allocated through CSOs in the DAC partner country, to be subsequently programmed by these CSOs with counterparts in developing countries (or through their own operations in these countries).

According to an analysis of CSO finance by DAC providers,¹⁹ between 2010 and 2016, the 6% share allocated directly to developing country-based CSOs has not changed (**Chart A3-6**). While allocations through provider country based CSO has declined from 77% to 69%, this share has been taken up by international NGOs (INGOs), whose share increased from 17% to 25%. These trends confirm the concerns expressed by some CSO country respondents in the 3MR that their national CSOs find it increasingly difficult to compete for resources with INGOs.

¹⁸ Note that only a minor of participating countries offered any narrative commentary in addition to their scoring.

¹⁹ OECD DAC, “Aid for Civil Society Organisations: Statistics based on DAC Members’ reporting to the Creditor Reporting System database (CRS), 2015-2016, January 2018, accessed April 2019 at <https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-topics/Aid-for-Civil-Society-Organisations-2015-2016.pdf>.

b) CSOs are becoming less a priority for DAC providers for long-term development purposes. The value of DAC provider finance to and through CSOs for long-term development objectives has not changed since Busan, despite a growth in overall DAC provider assistance through all channels.

Chart A3-6 Allocation of DAC ODA through CSOs by Type of CSO





Chart A3-7 Trends in DAC Donor Support to CSOs for Long Term Development Sectors




The value of resources to CSOs for sectors involving long-term development was US\$13.6 billion in 2012 and remains at the same level in 2017. (Chart A3-7) At the same time, between 2012 and

2017, DAC provider allocations for these purposes through non-CSO channels grew by 16% in this same period.²⁰

c) Increased financing to and through CSOs is mostly related to humanitarian assistance (**Chart A3-7**). Within the resources allocated to and through CSOs for all sectors, humanitarian assistance as a share of this total almost doubled from 15% in 2012 to 27% in 2017. Growth in humanitarian assistance through non-CSO channels, as a share of total allocations through these channels, also grew, but much more modestly from 9% in 2012 to 13% in 2017. (**Chart A3-8**)

Chart A3-8 Donor Support for Humanitarian Assistance by Channels of Delivery



Independent Data Sources: Recent reviews of DAC provider funding practices with CSOs

Increasing concerns about recent trends in DAC provider policies regarding funding modalities for CSOs have also been raised in some recent studies of select DAC providers.²¹ While these policies mainly affect relationships with CSOs in provider countries and INGO partners, provider policies

²⁰ These statistics have been calculated by the author based on data in the OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System, accessed April 2019. The value of resources is in constant 2017 US dollars.

²¹ See Boris Verbrugge & Huib Huyse, 2018. "Donor Relationships with Development CSOs at Cross-Roads? A comparative study of changing funding realities in 6 European countries," Research commissioned by NGO-federatie, Belgium, December 2018, accessed April 2019 at <https://www.ngo-federatie.be/system/files/2018-12/study%20CSO%20funding.pdf>. These providers included the United Kingdom, Belgium, Germany, Sweden, France, and the Netherlands. See also Romanian NGDO Platform – FOND, April 2018. Relations Between Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) from the Wider Black Sea Region and their Donors. Report developed by the Centre for International Cooperation and Development Studies (IDC) of the University of Bucharest (Romania), Accessed April 2019 at <http://www.balkanicsd.net/relations-between-csos-from-the-wider-black-sea-region-and-their-donors/>.

are carried forward in the partnership relationships between the latter and domestic CSOs in developing countries.

Among the findings are the following important trends:

- a) Several major providers have abandoned or reduced flexible program funding relationships with CSO partners (UK and the Netherlands), and in other countries they have never been a major modality (France, European Union). The predominance of ear-marked call-for-proposal funding relating to provider-determined sector and programming priorities in these funding relationships confirm the 3MR observation that these provider-directed priorities shape the priorities for CSOs in developing countries seeking provider support.
- b) The study of European providers pointed to “an evolution towards a more unstable and more fragmented funding landscape. In several cases, we are witnessing a proliferation of new and often smaller grant schemes with a narrower thematic/geographical focus.”²² This fragmentation can only compound existing concerns at the country level about transparency in provider funding programs and their criteria for selection.
- c) The studies found that bigger and more established INGOs and CSOs benefit from these changing funding modalities, with their increased focus on complex management for (short-term) results, log-frame designs, requiring sophisticated project management and linguistic skills.
- d) There are few if any DAC provider incentives in their funding modalities that aim to change long-standing concerns for developing country CSO dependency on these official sources. This reality is compounded by a sense of distrust and bias in any potential access to domestic government resources for development by local CSOs, which is accentuated by measures that are perceived to close civic space in these countries (see Module Four below).

Transparency in Development Partner Support for CSOs (Question Four)

Most CSO country respondents (64%) and Government respondents (53%) agreed that Development Partners either did not make available information about their support for CSOs, or only a few providers did so with aggregate information (Levels 1 and 2). About one-quarter suggested that most providers in their country at least make available this aggregate data. (Level 3) Government respondents in only 9 out of 41 countries (22%) said that providers made available detailed information on their CSO support in their country. (Level 4)

On the other hand, 74% of Development Partners in 31 countries said that they either made aggregate information available for most providers (35% at level 3) or provided detailed information on their civil society support (39% at level 4). There is no explanation for this large discrepancy between the perceptions of CSOs/Government and Development Partners.

²² Verbrugge and Huyse, op. cit.

Indicator Two respondent commentary on Development Partner transparency²³

Commentary on the availability of Development Partner information, particularly from Development Partners, suggests that this information is broadly accessible, including through computerized platforms for data on external finance (Albania, Cambodia, Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, Rwanda). Others (CSOs and Government) raised issues such as availability in national languages (Bangladesh); the lack of information at the activity/beneficiary level (Dominican Republic); minimal reporting by providers (Senegal); and the lack of reporting to government information management systems for external finance (Kenya, Malawi).

D) MODULE FOUR QUESTIONS: LEGAL AND REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT

Freedom of Assembly and Freedom of Expression (Question 1a and 1b)

Freedom of Assembly

The majority of CSO country respondents (57%) acknowledge that peaceful assemblies are allowed in law and in practice, but some (targeted) groups may be subject to discriminatory decision-making (Level 3). Government respondents are much more positive, with 68% indicating that most peaceful assemblies are allowed in practice regardless of the issues being raised or the groups participating (Level 4). CSOs observed that peaceful assemblies were severely restricted in a small number of countries (6), while Governments suggested that there were no countries where such restrictions were in place (Levels 1 and 2).

Development Partners completed this question in 30 countries with results that are very similar to Government respondents. They put 94% of these countries at Level 3 or 4, with only 1 country at Level 2.

Freedom of Expression

There are significant differences in perspective on the degree to which the legal and regulatory framework enables CSO freedom of expression in law and in practice. A very large majority of Government respondents (75%) suggest that expression by CSOs is generally free of control by the government (Level 4) and the remaining 25% of these respondents indicating some instances of government interference (Level 3).

On the other hand, 29% of CSO country respondents report that expression by CSOs and their members is either full controlled or extensively controlled by government (Levels 1 and 2). Another 36% of these respondents indicate some instance of government control (Level 3).

²³ Note that only a minor of participating countries offered any narrative commentary in addition to their scoring.

Development Partners completed this question in only 29 countries with results that are also very similar to Government respondents. They put 86% of these countries at Level 3 or 4, with only 2 countries at Level 2.


Indicator Two respondent commentary on freedom of assembly and freedom of expression²⁴

Some limitations on the freedom of assembly or areas that need improvement were noted in the commentary: Improvements needed in the law (Albania); unnecessary prior notification for public gatherings/meetings required (Cambodia); the need to resort to courts for some groups (Dominican Republic); and active discrimination against groups such as the LGBTQI community, often using vague prohibitions (Georgia, Kenya, Malawi).

With respect to the freedom of expression, it is noted that journalists can be subject to intimidation, lawsuits and job security threats (Albania, Kenya); increased frequency of attacks on critical CSOs to discredit their reputation (Georgia); and limitations on access to public media (Malawi). In Kenya, “television was shut down for a lengthy period to ensure citizens do not get updates on the political sensitive activities which can provoke mass reaction/demonstrations.”

Independent Data Sources: Bertelsmann Transformation Index for Freedoms of Assembly and Expression

Chart A3-9 Bertelsmann Freedom of Assembly in Law and Practice




²⁴ Note that only a minor of participating countries offered any narrative commentary in addition to their scoring.

Given the larger differences between responses by CSOs and Government, this Report compares the scores for 35 GPEDC-monitored countries with relevant data in the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) on Freedom of Assembly and Freedom of Expression.²⁵ As is apparent in the charts below, on freedom of assembly and freedom of expression, the BTI scores align more closely with CSO respondents for 3MR countries than Government respondents.

For Freedom of Assembly, the BTI scores are slightly less positive than those provided by CSOs in the 3MR, but significantly less so than those for Government (See **Chart A3-9**).


For Freedom of Expression, 3MR CSOs and the BTI are similarly aligned, with Government respondents far more positive than the BTI independent experts' scores for their countries (See **Chart A3-10**)

Chart A3-10 Bertelsmann Freedom of Expression in Law and Practice



²⁵ The BTI is a survey of political and economic transformation around the world published each year. Independent country experts develop the scores for the various indicators, are peer reviewed, and then are standardized across countries. Data for the Bertelsmann Transformation Index is available at <https://www.bti-project.org/en/data/>. See **Annex Six** for the explanatory codes for this Index in relation to the levels for Module 4, Questions 1A and 1B, in the GPEDC Indicator Framework.

Chart A3-11 Bertelsmann Transformative Index, 2018



There are BTI scores for 62 of the 86 countries participating in 3MR. These scores reveal that approximately a third of these countries have conditions for freedom of assembly that independent experts describe as “often subject to interference or government restrictions” or “independent civic groups do not exist or are prohibited”. A similar number of countries have conditions for freedom of expression where this freedom is “often subject to interference or government restrictions” or is “denied [and] independent media do not exist or are prohibited”. (See Levels 1 and 2 in **Chart A3-11**)

An Enabling Legal and Regulatory Framework for CSOs (Question Two)

Among Government respondents, 88% suggest that regulations governing the formation, registration and operation of CSOs either “do not hinder the activities of CSOs” (28% in Level 3) or “actively promotes the activities of CSOs, including advocacy and human rights groups” (60% in Level 4). Only 23% of CSO country respondents put regulatory conditions for CSOs at Level 4. Approximately half (52%) of CSOs suggest that CSOs are generally allowed to operate freely and registration is moderately demanding (Level 3).

But regulatory conditions are a major issue for a significant number of CSO respondents. One-quarter (25%) of these respondents (in 11 countries) suggest that registration is either “mandatory, difficult, lengthy, costly and required periodically” (11% in Level 1) or “remains a difficult process, especially for advocacy-oriented groups” – key organizations for holding government to account (14% in Level 2). This number increases to 18 out of 54 countries (33%) when all CSO responses are considered (3MR and CPDE Survey). Government respondents find these conditions in only 5 countries.

Development Partners responses in 30 countries were closer to CSO 3MR respondents for this question. They had 7 countries (or 23% of the 30 countries) at levels 1 and 2.

Indicator Two respondent commentary on an enabling legal and regulatory environment²⁶

While several countries report that CSO registration is not onerous (Albania, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Mozambique), others report inter alia a lack of transparency for court decision affecting human rights defenders (Benin); long delays in the process (Cote D'Ivoire); costly, difficult and time consuming registration, and affects on access to funding (Madagascar, Malawi, Mali); targeting groups of marginalized populations (Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique); and demanding for small community oriented organizations (Rwanda). CSOs in Kenya note, "The NGO Coordination Act has the power to deregister an NGO who would be perceived to act against the government."

Independent Data Sources: USAID Civil Society Organization Sustainability Index, 2017

USAID produces an annual Sustainability Index for countries in Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe covering the legal environment, organizational capacity, financial viability, advocacy, service provision, sectoral infrastructure, and public image.²⁷ This Index covers 37 of the 86 countries participating in the Third Monitoring Round. For these 37 countries in 2017 (the last year for data), the legal environment for fully half (18) was assessed to be "impeding" the sustainability of CSOs. Independent experts undertook this assessment.

Independent Data Sources: Bertelsmann Transformation Index Indicators: 1) Extent of Networks of Cooperative Organizations, 2) Extent of Social Self-Organization, and 3) Enabling the Participation of Civil Society

Several indicators in the Bertelsmann Transformation Index provide an overall context for the development of strong civil society engagement in the GPEDC 3MR countries.²⁸ These indicators are not directly comparable to the 3MR question on the degree to which the regulatory environment enables CSOs. But the extent of networks of cooperative organizations, the extent of the level societal trust and civic self-organization, and the degree to which governments enable the participation of civil society establish a broad environment in which CSOs may or may not flourish (**Charts A3-12 and A3-13**). These Charts allocate BTI scores similar to the framework for Indicator Two (see **Annex Four** for details).

²⁶ Note that only a minor of participating countries offered any narrative commentary in addition to their scoring.

²⁷ USAID, Civil Society Sustainability Index, various regions, 2017, accessible at <https://www.usaid.gov/what-we-do/democracy-human-rights-and-governance/supporting-vibrant-civil-society-independent-media>.

²⁸ Data for the Bertelsmann Transformation Index is available at <https://www.bti-project.org/en/data/>. See **Annex Seven** for the explanatory codes for this Index in relation to the Charts set out below.

Chart A3-12 Bertelsmann Transformative Index, Civil Society Indicators, Indicator Two Countries





Chart A3-13 Bertelsmann Transformative Index, Civil Society Indicators, 3MR Countries



The BTI indicators suggest that conditions for civil society are very difficult in a significant number of countries that participated in Indicator Two (40% of the countries on average over the three Indicators). (Chart A3-12) For all the countries participating in the Third Monitoring Round, on


average 45% of the countries had scores at Levels 1 and 2, in which civil society is frequently suppressed, a small number of autonomous self-organized groups exist, or a large number of social interests remain unrepresented. (**Chart A3-13**) While factors influencing these conditions go well beyond the regulatory environment, these indicators would suggest that laws and regulations promoting robust civic organization and engagement likely do not exist.

Independent Data Sources: V-Dem Indicators for CSO Enabling Legal and Regulatory Environment

The V-Dem Institute provides some interesting indicators relating to government control over CSOs and the repression of CSOs in 72 of the 86 GPEDC monitored countries.²⁹

According to independent country experts, V-Dem considered CSO conditions for about 40% of the 72 GPEDC monitored countries with data in 2018 to be subject to unreasonable government control. (**Chart A3-14**) In 16 countries (22%), governments are reported to exert either monopolistic or substantial control over CSOs whereby government bars organizations that are likely to oppose the government. In a further 12 countries (17%), government exerts moderate control in which prohibited organizations are harassed, but still manage to continue to exist and function.


Chart A3-14 V-Dem Government Control over Entry/Exit of CSOs in Public Life



V-Dem Database: <https://www.v-dem.net/en/analysis/VariableGraph/> CSO entry and exit (C) (v2cseeorgs)

²⁹ The Institute publishes a disaggregated set of annual datasets on democracy that reflects the complexity of democracy as a system of rule. It relies on a team of over 50 social scientists on six continents and more than 3,000 country experts to develop and analyze the data. See **Annex Eight** for scoring details.

Chart A3-15 V-Dem Does government attempt to repress civil society organizations?



V-Dem Database: <https://www.v-dem.net/en/analysis/VariableGraph/>
 CSO repression (C) (v2csreprss) Average Experts Scoring

Another V-Dem indicator measuring the level of CSO repression confirms these conditions. (**Chart A3-15**) In 14 (19%) out of 72 GPEDC monitored countries experts reported that CSOs were severely to substantially repressed. In another 14 countries (19%) civil society organizations are moderately repressed with minor legal harassment, burdensome registration, and material sanctions such as fines or denial of services. These countries account for 38% of the 72 monitored countries.

Protection of CSOs working with marginalized populations (Question Three)

Almost a third (32%) of CSO country respondents reported that CSOs working with marginalized groups often experienced severe discrimination (1 country in Level 1), or legal protection applied inconsistently, with few legal or judicial recourses (13 countries in Level 2).

Governments are significantly more positive about their level of protection of these CSOs. Government respondents placed only 4 countries at these lowest levels. On the other hand, 59% of these respondents in 23 countries stated that “laws, regulations and policies effectively safeguarded CSOs working with marginalized populations” (Level 4), with a further 12 countries at Level 3. CSO country respondents had only 9 countries at Level 4, with many more at Level 3 – 21 countries.

Development Partners in 29 countries were equally positive as Government, with only 3 countries at Level 2.

Indicator Two respondent commentary on protection of CSOs working with marginalized populations³⁰

Where laws / regulations do not hinder CSOs working with marginalized populations, CSOs called for safeguard legislation to protect such CSOs from discrimination (Albania). In some countries a law protecting human rights defenders exist (Cote d'Ivoire) or is in process (Dominican Republic). Among the few countries that offered comments for this question, some reported challenges for CSOs working on sensitive issues (Cambodia, Kenya), while some countries have no laws protecting vulnerable populations (Malawi, Togo).

Independent Data Sources: Increasing Attacks on Human Rights Defenders

Increasing numbers of human rights defenders (HRDs), many of who have been protecting the rights of vulnerable communities, have been killed over the past five years. According to Frontline Defenders, the preeminent organization tracking attacks on human rights defenders, 321 HRDs were killed in 2018 in 27 countries, 77% of whom were working on land, indigenous peoples and environmental rights. These were among the 623 reported violations against HRDs in that year, including detention/arrest, legal action, and threats / smear campaign / verbal abuse.³¹

Since 2016 more than 900 human rights defenders have been murdered. These numbers have been growing since 2016, when the total for the year was 281.³² Among the 86 countries responding to the GPEDC's 3MR, 182 HRDs were killed in 2017 and 2018 in 14 countries. Eight of these countries completed Indicator Two. Government respondents in Guatemala and in the Philippines reported that "laws, regulations and policies effectively safeguard CSOs working with marginalized populations, and discriminatory actions are an exception," (Level 4) despite documented killings of 37 and 100 HRDs respectively in 2017 and 2018 in these countries!

Independent Data Sources: Bertelsmann Transformation Index: Guaranteeing and Protecting Civil Rights

Among the 3MR countries that completed Indicator Two and the 62 3MR countries for which there is data, independent assessments summarized in the Bertelsmann Transformation Index point to very high levels of violations of civil rights and either no or ineffective "mechanisms and institutions to prosecute, punish and redress violations of civil rights." These conditions are the reality for more than a third (39%) of Indicator Two reporting countries and almost a half (48%) of all 3MR countries (62 with data). (See **Charts A3-16 and A3-17**). Only a very small minority of countries were assessed at Level 4 – "residents are effectively protected by mechanisms and institutions established to prosecute, punish and redress violations of their rights."

³⁰ Note that only a minor of participating countries offered any narrative commentary in addition to their scoring.

³¹ Front Line Defenders, *Front Line Defenders Global Analysis, 2018*, January 2019, accessed April 2019 at https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/sites/default/files/global_analysis_2018.pdf.

³² Annual reports of Front Line Defenders for 2016, 2017 and 2018.

Chart A3-16 Bertelsmann Protecting Civil Rights, Indicator Two Countries






Chart A3-17 Bertelsmann Protecting Civil Rights, 3MR Countries



Independent Sources: V-Dem Indicators for equal protection of rights and freedoms and freedom from political killing

V-Dem Institute country level experts rate their country against various broad indicators for a democratic culture of practice. This practice includes the condition whereby all social groups have equal protection for their rights and freedoms and political activists are free from the fear of political killing.

Chart A3-18 V-Dem Equal Protection Index




V-Dem Database: <https://www.v-dem.net/en/analysis/VariableGraph/>
Equal protection index (D) (v2xeg_eqprotec) Average Experts' Scoring

In 27% of the 71 GPEDC monitored countries with data, the protection of rights and freedoms by the state across social groups is weak. And in another 44% of these countries this protection is only rated as moderate. (**Chart A3-18**)

In a substantial number of GPEDC monitored countries, conditions for human rights defenders and other political activists are not safe. (**Chart A3-19**) Out of 71 countries for which there is data, 15 countries (21%) are scored by experts as very serious, in which frequent political killings occur and top leaders in government may incite and are not actively working to prevent them. In another 10 countries (14%) such killings are occasional, but are not incited by top leaders of government. Together these countries make up 35% of the surveyed countries.

Chart A3-19 V-Dem Is there freedom from political killings?



V-Dem Database: <https://www.v-dem.net/en/analysis/VariableGraph/>
 Freedom from political killings (C) (v2clkill)

CSO Access to Resources (Question Four)

Among the 3MR 44 countries with CSO respondents, only 6 (14%) reported that access to resources were highly restricted or subject to government restrictions (Levels 1 or 2). Government reported only 3 countries at these levels of practice. On the other hand, CSOs perceived more informal restrictions than Government (Level 3), whereby CSOs can access national and international resources. They placed 66% of the countries at this level, while Government placed 55% at Level 4 “with few or no restrictions”. Development Partners’ responses for 30 countries are largely consistent with those of Government respondents. Among all CSO responding countries (54), 19% placed their country at highly restricted or subject to government restrictions for access to resources.

Indicator Two respondent commentary on CSO access to resources³³

Several countries commented that there are currently few if any restrictions in CSO access to domestic or international resources to further their objectives (Albania, Cambodia, Cote d’Ivoire). Others pointed to the need to improved capacities for CSOs to diversify and access resources (Benin); issues with tax exception status for CSOs (Dominican Republic, Togo); lack of access to public domestic resources (Malawi); and a scarcity of financial resources for CSOs (Madagascar).

³³ Note that only a minor of participating countries offered any narrative commentary in addition to their scoring.

Independent Data Sources: Databases on access to resources

The International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL) maintains a substantial database on CSO law and regulations in 54 countries, including current information on restrictions for CSOs to access international and domestic resources.³⁴ Amnesty International also recently published a review of laws and regulations affecting CSOs in about 50 countries.³⁵ A review of these databases suggests that restrictions on foreign finance is part of the legal/regulatory framework for a significant number of GPEDC monitored countries -- 15 out of 35 GPEDC monitored countries for which there is data, or 43% of these countries.

³⁴ See the database at <http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/index.html>.

³⁵ Amnesty International, *Laws Designed to Silence: The global crackdown on civil society organizations*, 2019, accessed at <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/act30/9647/2019/en/>.