Trends in Canadian Aid

Briefing Note Four

Channels for Delivering Canadian ODA:
Disaggregating Canadian aid flows through multilaterals and CSOs

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Part One: An Overview of Channels of Delivery for Canadian ODA

Prepared for Cooperation Canada

Brian Tomlinson
AidWatch Canada

Channels for Delivering Canadian ODA

1. Overview of Delivery Channels

Multilateral organizations (56%) and Civil Society Organizations (22%) are the primary channels for delivering Canadian Real ODA (2024/25). Core support (assessed contributions) for multilateral organizations is 14% of Real ODA and bilateral ODA channeled through multilateral organizations accounts for 26% of total ODA and 38% of bilateral aid in 2024/25.

Canada's multilateral and bilateral Real ODA[1] is delivered through a variety of governmental and non-governmental channels. **Chart One** disaggregates the relative importance of these channels for 2024/25, the latest year for which data is available. Disbursements through multilateral organizations, including Multilateral Development Banks, made up 56% of Canadian Real ODA in 2024/25, with CSOs (Canadian and foreign) accounting for 22%. These multilateral shares are lower than the average disbursements for 2018/19 to 2022/23, which accounted for 65% of Real ODA.

Chart One: Real ODA Delivery Channels, 2024/25 Disbursements



Source: GAC Historical Projects Datasets

The Department of Finance manages Canada's support for the World Bank's International Development Association (IDA) concessional window for low-income countries. It managed 14% of Real ODA in

[1] Real ODA is Actual ODA less in-donor refugee costs, imputed student costs, and debt cancellation. It is ODA that is potentially directly accessible to country governments and partners in the global south.

2024/25, up from 12% in the 2018/19 to 2022/23 period. GAC manages Canada's support for Regional Development Banks, accounting for 2% of Real ODA. Close to 45% of the Department of Finance ODA through the World Bank / IMF in 2024/25 was directed to Ukraine, which may account for its greater share in Real ODA.

Canada's core support for multilateral organizations (untied assessed contributions) is approximately 14% of total Real ODA. The channeling of bilateral ODA through multilateral organizations represents an additional 26% of total ODA and almost half (46%) of all ODA channeled through multilateral organizations. These are termed Multi/Bi funds and are often tied to specific provider priorities. Multi-Bi funding accounted for 38% of Canadian bilateral aid in 2024/25.

Partner country governments implemented only 1% of total Real ODA, while GAC and other providers implemented 6% of this ODA.

IDRC's share of Real ODA has grown slightly from 2% earlier in the decade to 3% in 2024/25, reaching a high of $192 million in 2024/25. Federal Budget 2025 reduced IDRC's Canadian Government support by $11.4 million in fiscal year 2026/27, and by approximately $24 million per year by 2029/30.

'Other channels' are mainly ODA allocated by federal departments other than the Department of Finance, Global Affairs and IDRC.

2. Delivering Canadian aid through Multilateral Institutions

In 2024/25, Canada delivered 56% of its ODA through multilateral organizations and IFIs. Multilateral channels account for 35% of Canadian bilateral ODA in that year.

Multi-bi initiatives are a major channel for Canadian ODA. In 2024, Canada ranked 2nd among 32 DAC providers in earmarked contributions to multilateral organizations, which accounted for 69% of its total multilateral contributions. This share is up sharply from an average of 45% in 2015–19, when Canada still ranked third behind the United States and Norway. The recent increase was largely driven by support for Ukraine.

In recent years, 25% of Canada's Real ODA has been disbursed through IFIs. For the World Bank's International Development Association (IDA) concessional window for the poorest countries, Canada ranks 7th in the latest IDA21 replenishment (2026 to 2028) contributing 3.08% of that replenishment, with approximately the same level of finance as its contributions to IDA20. Canada has disbursed approximately $520 million per year for IDA20.

In 2024/25, Canada delivered 56% of its ODA, down from an average of 65% over the previous few years, through multilateral organizations and International Financial Institutions (IFIs), such as UN organizations or the World Bank, either as core funding for these institutions or as dedicated funds created by Canada or by other bilateral donors within these organizations.

In that year, Canada channeled $1,692 million in ODA through UN organizations. Of this amount, 77% were bilateral resources and just over a third (34%) of this UN funding was directed to humanitarian purposes. Health, population and reproductive health accounted for another 17% of these allocations. Within the UN system, the following organizations were the top 15 recipients (share of total support for UN organizations) supported by Canada in 2024/25:

1. WFP - World Food Programme $289 million (17%)
2. UNICEF - United Nations Children's Fund $150 million (9%)
3. UNFPA - United Nations Population Fund $147 million (9%)
4. UNDP - United Nations Development Programme $143 million (8%)
5. UNHCR - High Commissioner for Refugees $104 million (6%)
6. OCHA - Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs $89 million (5%)
7. WHO - World Health Organization $82 million (5%)
8. United Nations Department of Operational Support $74 million (4%)
9. United Nations Organization $65 million (4%)
10. UNRWA - Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees $60 million (4%)
11. FAO - Food and Agriculture Organization $58 million (3%)
12. IFAD - International Fund for Agricultural Development $41 million (2%)
13. UN Women $40 million (2%)
14. UNDP Multi-Donor Trust Fund Office $39 million (2%)
15. CERF - Central Emergency Response Fund $29 million (2%)

These 15 organizations account for 83% of all Canadian ODA funding through the UN system. Canada's assessed share for the UN regular budget is 2.62%. But much of its financing is voluntary support beyond this regular budget. Overall, Canada provides just under 2% of total finance received by the UN and its constituent organizations. Canada's total support for the UN has been growing modestly since 2019/20 (discounting special financing for COVID-19 Control). However, its 2024/25 level at $1,692 million is 16% below its peak in 2020/21. (**Chart Two**)

Chart Two: Canada's Total Support for UN System, 2019 to 2024
Discounting COVID-19 Contributions, Support through ODA



2.1 Multi-Bi funds and the effectiveness of the multilateral system

Multilateral organizations and Canadian / foreign CSOs have been major channels for Canada's bilateral ODA. (See C**hart Three**) While CSOs (Canadian and Foreign) delivered 28% of Canadian bilateral ODA, multilateral channels accounted for 44% of this ODA in 2024/25, including 35% delivered by GAC through bilateral ODA – Multi-Bi initiatives.

Chart Three: Delivery Channels for Canadian Bilateral ODA, 2024/25



Multi/Bi initiatives are earmarked resources that are managed by a multilateral organization, but the policies directing the allocation of these funds are usually governed by Canada and other bilateral providers who contribute. While they reduce administrative burdens for GAC and other bilateral providers, they often increase program fragmentation within many key multilateral organizations, undermining coherent multilateral strategies related to their mandate.[2] These Multi/Bi funds make it more difficult to track and hold Canada accountable for its bilateral allocations. (See **Annex One** for DAC definitions of core and multi-bi financing.)

[2] According to the DAC's *Multilateral Development Finance, 2024* report, "earmarking … presents several challenges. For individual organisations, these include funding vulnerability, since earmarked contributions tend to be less predictable, more volatile and more transaction-heavy than core contributions. … In some cases, earmarking funds to multilateral agencies' crisis response plans can even undermine the very flexibility required in crisis and fragile situations, and can hinder the Resident Co-ordinator's role of driving greater co-ordination and prioritisation of development efforts across humanitarian, development and peace actors …" *DAC Multilateral Development Finance, 2024,* page 59, accessed at https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/multilateral-development-finance-2024_8f1e2b9b-en.html.

Geopolitical fragmentation has weakened the effectiveness of the multilateral system over the past decade, a trend that is now compounded by major reductions in financing. In the words of the DAC's *Multilateral Development Finance, 2026* report,

> "As a broad-base consensus becomes harder to achieve, donors … increasingly rely on narrower, coalition-based forms of engagement to advance specific priorities. The proliferation of vertical funds and other purpose-specific mechanisms since the 2000s in part reflects this trend. In a sense, the 'variable geometry' multilateralism invoked by some political leaders [including Canada] is the intensification of a longer term trend, now accelerated by growing contestation of multilateralism and increasingly divergent priorities among donors."[3]

Multilateral organizations (the UN system and the multilateral development banks) rely on financing based on assessed contributions to implement their core mandate and strategic priorities. Preliminary DAC data highlight that this core financing for the UN system by DAC providers has fallen dramatically, by more than 27% between 2023 and 2025. Shifts towards increased voluntary earmarking of multilateral funding in relation to assessed contributions and voluntary unrestricted funding will further erode the foundational mandates of these already weakened UN organizations. While there is no specific data for UN organizations, the DAC has calculated that core multilateral contributions have already shrunk from 28% of finance for the multilateral system as a whole in 2021 to 23% in 2024.[4]

Multilateral earmarking of bilateral aid as a share of DAC members' total multilateral contributions has increased from 38% in 2019 to 46% in 2024, driven somewhat by financing for Ukraine through the IMF. At 69%, Canada ranked 2nd among DAC providers in its earmarked share for its total multilateral contributions, after only the United States at 72%.[5] (See **Annex Two**) For Canada, this share is a substantial increase from the average 45% for the 2015 to 2019 five-year period, when Canada still ranked third after the United States and Norway.

Some UN organizations with the highest level of Canadian support in 2024 are also among the largest recipients of Canadian earmarked disbursements – World Food Program: 90% of Canada's contribution of US$184.2 million earmarked; UNICEF: 93% of US$157.6 million; the UN Population Fund: 89% of US$104.4 million; and UNDP: 66% of US$85.1 million.[6]

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[3] OECD DAC, Multilateral Development Finance, 2026, page 16, accessed at https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/2026/04/multilateral-development-finance-2026_4fdfa737.html. The *DAC Multilateral Development Finance, 2024* report suggested that "recent research suggests that, in practice, earmarking is commonly used by donors to exert influence on multilateral organisations' priorities, bypassing the complex political negotiations associated with a change in core assessed contributions…", page 57, accessed at https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/multilateral-development-finance-2024_8f1e2b9b-en.html.

[4] OECD DAC, Multilateral Development Finance, 2026, op. cit., page 23

[5] Author's calculation based on DAC Development Cooperation Profiles, chart on Bilateral and Multilateral ODA Allocations, accessed August 2026 at https://www.oecd.org/en/topics/sub-issues/development-co-operation-profiles.html#official-providers.

[6] Author's calculations based on DAC Development Cooperation Profiles, chart for Canada on Top 10 UN Recipients, 2024, accessed August 2026 at https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/development-co-operation-profiles_04b376d7-en/canada_0c742aaa-en.html.

In an era of intensifying global crises in an increasingly fragile world, a strong multilateral system, with effective UN organizations at its core, is indispensable to collective action on the climate emergency, protracted conflict, pandemic preparedness and humanitarian needs. With the UN system facing dramatic challenges and reduced financing, Canada should maximize its core support for multilateral organizations, contribute more than its fair share to replenishments, and strengthen pooled multi-donor funding mechanisms and inter-agency pooled funds.

Canada should adopt a more strategic and "future-fit" approach to multilateralism, reducing the fragmentation and constraints on multilateral organizations created by extensive earmarking. At the same time, the Government should clarify the role and rationale for multi-bi funding and restore greater balance to Canada's bilateral ODA, including through stronger direct partnerships with development actors in partner countries.

2.2 International Financial Institutions (IFIs)

International Financial Institutions (IFIs) – the World Bank, the IMF and Regional Development Banks – play a large role in channeling Canadian ODA. In recent years 25% of Real ODA has been disbursed through IFIs. The exceptions were 2020/21 (due to a spike in COVID-19 related ODA) and 2022/23 (due to large loans for Ukraine through the IMF). Loans for Ukraine continue to influence these flows. There is a similar pattern for IFIs' share in total multilateral disbursements. While down from 57% in 2022/23, total IFI ODA as a share of Canada's total multilateral finance remained above 40% in 2023/24 and 2024/25. (**Table One**)

Table One: Multilateral Flows through International Financial Institutions (IFIs)
(Disbursements, Millions of Canadian Dollars)

	2018/19	2019/20	2020/21	2021/22	2022/23	2023/24	2024/25
World Bank IDA	$493	$490	$488	$784	$1,114	$518	$518
Other World Bank	$611	$419	$414	$956	$833	$204	$472
Regional Dev Banks	$345	$342	$494	$109	$599	$383	$377
IMF / BIS	$25	$3	$6		$1,653	$745	$461
Total IFIs	**$1,474**	**$1,254**	**$1,402**	**$1,849**	**$4,199**	**$1,850**	**$1,828**
Total Multilateral	$3,547	$4,461	$3,673	$4,096	$7,377	$4,524	$4,340
Share of Multilateral	42%	28%	38%	45%	57%	41%	42%
Share of Real ODA	27%	25%	18%	27%	41%	25%	25%

Source: HPDS, by Departments (Finance, FinDev and GAC), Project Titles (IDA), GAC Org by Class, and Recipient Organizations; Real ODA is Actual ODA less in-donor refugee costs, imputed student costs and debt cancellation.

The World Bank's International Development Association (IDA) is a critical resource for highly concessional loans and grants to 78 eligible countries, including 24 low-income countries (per capita income less than US$1,175 in 2025).[7] Because of IDA's high level of concessionality, it must be financed by providers in

[7] IDA eligible countries are a broader category than low-income countries, with an IDA income cut off of $1,365 per capita income and capacities to borrow on market terms. A number of countries (e.g. Kosovo, Sri Lanka, Cape

replenishment cycles every three years. Most of the Bank's lending to middle-income countries is at market rates and is not eligible to be included as ODA. These resources for middle-income countries come from Bank borrowing on international markets based on its capitalization by donors.

For the IDA 20 replenishment (2022 to 2025), Canada contributed 3.45% of the replenishment, down from 3.89% for IDA17 (2015 to 2018). For IDA 21 (2026 to 2028), the Bank called for a US$100 billion replenishment, up from US$93 billion for IDA 20. The Bank reported that it achieved this target at its December 2024 meeting. While Bank members contributed only US$23.7 billion, up slightly from US$23.3 billion for IDA20, the balance is the result of leverage on capital markets and reflows.[8]

Canada's contribution and share for IDA 21 (3.08%) remain close to its contribution to IDA 20. In recent replenishments it has ranked 7th, next to China. Canada has disbursed approximately Cdn$520 million per year for IDA20. (See **Table One** and **Annex Three** for details of IDA replenishments.)

The IFIs have been an increasing source of development finance in the face of multiple global crises (the impacts of wars, the climate emergency, pandemics and food insecurities). Providers, including Canada, are at the same time reducing their ODA and/or refocusing it on their economic and security interests (e.g. Germany, France, Sweden, Canada and the UK). There is significant political pressure on the IFIs from their largest (DAC member) shareholders to ramp up IFI capacities for financing to fill the gap.

In 2022 the G20 Experts Group called for a tripling of IFI lending from US$130 billion a year to US$390 billion a year by 2030, with a greater focus on climate and nature-related investments.[9] Such an increase requires greater efficiency in Bank borrowing and ultimately new injections of capital by DAC providers, for which there is strong resistance by some (i.e. the United States). Subsequent G20 presidencies (India – 2023; Brazil – 2024) built on this initiative culminating in the G20 "Roadmap towards Better, Bigger and More Effective MDBs", adopted by G20 leaders in November 2024.[10] It calls for more capital efficiency and lending volume, more country-owned programming through country platforms, and stronger collaboration between institutions.

Verde) remain eligible for IDA loans due to their continued lack of creditworthiness, including an inability to qualify for standard World Bank loans.

[8] Erin Collinson, Clemence Landers, Justin Hurley and Grace Miner, "ABCs of the IFIs: Understanding the World Bank's IDA21 Replenishment," Center for Global Development, June 17, 2024, accessed at https://www.cgdev.org/publication/abcs-ifis-understanding-world-banks-ida21-replenishment.

[9] G20 Independent Experts, "The Triple Agenda: A roadmap for better, bolder and bigger MDBs," Center for Global Development, October 13, 2023, accessed at https://www.cgdev.org/publication/triple-agenda-roadmap-better-bolder-and-bigger-mdbs. See also Ellmers, B. "Bridgetown Initiative 3.0 released: What's the news," Global Policy Forum, June 5, 2024, accessed at https://www.globalpolicy.org/en/news/2024-06-05/bridgetown-initiative-30-released-whats-news.

[10] See G20 4th Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors Meeting, October 2024, accessed at https://coebank.org/documents/1724/G20_Roadmap_towards_better_bigger_and_more_effective_MDBs_T69DXmX.pdf.

The UN Financing for Development Conference, held in Sevilla in June/July 2025, explicitly calls for a tripling of MDB lending, accompanied by reforms of the international financial architecture, including tax cooperation, a borrowers' forum and debt relief mechanisms.

The World Bank has responded through its 2023 Evolution Roadmap, a renewed focus on climate through a new mission statement – end poverty on a liveable planet, and technical changes to expand lending through balance sheet measures. The urgent need for climate finance has been a driver for scaling up IFI lending. At COP29 in Baku in late 2024, the international community agreed to a New Collective Quantifiable Goal for climate finance with a floor of US$300 billion a year by 2035 from developed countries and a broader goal to mobilize US$1.3 trillion from all sources. The MDBs are seen to have a central role in mobilizing this climate finance.

Since 2021, the World Bank has established a target of 45% co-benefit climate finance target, which it reported to have exceeded. IDA has a separate 45% target running through to 2028. While the IDA target remains, in 2026 the US Government has successfully pressured the Bank to drop the 45% target. But on the other hand, the Bank's Climate Change Action Plan was extended indefinitely. The MDBs have reported a more than doubling of their total climate finance for low- and middle-income countries since 2019, from US$41 billion in 2019 to US$103 billion in 2025.[11] The focus is mainly on mitigation (on average 60% to 76%) mostly in upper middle-income countries.

While these seem like impressive commitments to climate finance, CSOs have raised concerns about the accuracy and transparency of the World Bank's climate finance reporting of projects with climate co-benefits. The Center for Global Development analyzed 2,500 projects tagged for mitigation or adaptation between 2020 and 2022, revealing numerous projects seemingly unrelated to climate change.[12] Oxfam has calculated that climate finance reporting by the Bank and IDA could be inflated by up to 40%.[13]

Expanding the remit of the MDBs, while scaling up often highly conditioned lending, may appear to offer a path that compensates for declining bilateral aid on the part of Canada and other DAC providers. For least developed and many lower middle-income countries, however, this approach risks compounding existing debt distress, with additional debt burdens. According to UNCTAD, today, 3.3 billion people live in countries that spend more on interest payments than on health, and 2.1 billion live in countries that spend more on interest payments than on education. In 2024 alone, global south countries spent US$921 billion on interest payments – a 10% increase compared to 2023.[14]

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[11] See Joint Report on MDB Climate Finance, various years.

[12] Guido Núñez-Mujica, et. al., "What Counts as climate? Preliminary Evidence from the World Bank's Climate Portfolio," Center for Global Development, June 14, 2023, accessed at https://www.cgdev.org/publication/what-counts-climate-preliminary-evidence-world-banks-climate-portfolio.

[13] Oxfam, "Unaccountable Accounting: The World Bank's unreliable climate finance reporting," October 2022, accessed at https://policy-practice.oxfam.org/resources/unaccountable-accounting-the-world-banks-unreliable-climate-finance-reporting-621424/.

[14] UNCTAD, "Global public debt hit a record $102 trillion in 2024, striking developing countries hardest," June 26, 2025, accessed at https://unctad.org/news/global-public-debt-hit-record-102-trillion-2024-striking-developing-countries-hardest

3. Direct Bilateral Support for Partner Country Governments

Canada has substantially reduced its direct engagement with partner country governments through its ODA. Only six partner countries were implementing Canadian ODA in 2024/25, with total disbursements of $76.1 million (or 1.7% of Canada's Real Bilateral Aid for that year).

As noted in **Section 1** above, only a very small share of Canada's ODA (1%) was channeled directly through governments in 2024/25. Only $76.1 million in GAC bilateral aid was allocated to governments in the global south. These disbursements included $17.5 million for the Government of Jordan, $15 million for Tanzania, $13.9 million for Moldova, $10.5 million for Ghana, and $5 million each for the Governments of Mozambique and Senegal. By contrast, in 2010/11, $335 million of Canadian bilateral ODA implemented by governments was channeled through 13 identifiable partner country governments.

While Canadian aid channeled through multilateral organizations does finance development programming with partner country governments, these relationships are indirect with respect to Canadian aid and country interests.

Canadian ODA is therefore a marginal channel in recent years for direct engagement with partner country governments through Canada's aid program. General and Sector Budget Support played an important role in Canadian bilateral aid in the 2000s. In 2024/25, budget support was a mere $50.9 million, which was 67% of the $76.1 million channeled directly to partner governments. But as a share of Real Bilateral ODA in that year, it was insignificant. (See **Table Two**) In the context of GAC's commitment to locally-led development, Canada has largely abandoned direct efforts that strengthen partner government ministries to deliver programming.

Table Two: Sector Budget Support in Canada's Real Bilateral ODA

	Share of Real Bilateral ODA
2008/09	8%
2010/11	6%
2021/22	1%
2022/23	0.5%
2024/25	1.1%

4. Private Sector Channels and Mobilizing Private Sector Resources for Development

Canada places a strong emphasis on mobilization of private sector resources for development through various blended finance initiatives. A primary channel is FinDev Canada created for this purpose in 2018, but Canada also promotes private sector mobilization through various multilateral development banks' windows. Canada reported to the DAC only US$161 million in mobilized private finance in 2024. FinDev Canada has received a massive injection of capital ($2.7 billion) for climate finance for the period 2026/27 to 2030/31.

The private sector directly implemented only 2% of Canadian ODA in 2024/25. Nevertheless, mobilizing private sector finance through Canadian ODA is a key objective for the Government. To this end, FinDev Canada was created in 2018 by the Government as Canada's Development Finance Institution (DFI),

focusing on mobilizing private sector resources for sustainable development.[15] (See B**riefing Note Two, Section 2** for more detail on Canada's use of private sector instruments.)

Including recent announcements for the 2026/27 to 2030/31 climate finance pledge, FinDev has received a total of $4.12 billion in paid-in capitalization, of which $808 million is for concessional initiatives. To date, most of these resources have been derived from EDC retained earnings, and not the IAE, thus protecting IAE resources for other purposes. This FinDev capitalization has amounted to about 3% of Real ODA cumulatively between 2018/19 and 2024/25. The share will likely increase in future years as the $2.7 billion in capitalization for climate finance is deployed between 2026/27 and 2030/31.

Since 2018/19 a large share of Canada's international climate finance is delivered through blended finance programs with the private sector, mainly located within Regional Development Banks, the World Bank's International Finance Corporation and the Climate Investment Funds managed by the World Bank. Through Canada's replenishments of the World Bank's International Development Association (IDA), Canada is supporting the IDA Private Sector Window, which promotes private investment in IDA countries through concessional blended finance. This Window has committed US$4.6 billion since 2018.[16]

The OECD DAC has begun to publish statistics on mobilized private finance from its Creditor Reporting System. For 2024, the CRS documents US$16,559 million in DAC members' mobilized private finance. Canada reported only US$161 million in 2024 and US$234 million in 2023.[17] According to the latest DAC report on mobilized private finance, more than 70% of this finance went to middle-income countries, with 8% to low-income countries in 2024. About 40% was directed to climate finance, of which 70% addressed mitigation, 22% addressed both mitigation and adaptation, and only 8% focused exclusively on adaptation. The DAC calls for greater transparency and methodological consistency among DAC members in reporting mobilized finance. CSOs raise questions on causality, i.e. the degree to which a private investment is actually mobilized with official aid resources, and the development impacts of mobilized finance.[18]

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[15] See https://www.findevcanada.ca/en. FinDev Canada's project portfolio is available at https://www.findevcanada.ca/en/what-we-do/our-portfolio.

[16] Mathiasen, K., Lee, N., and Samuel Matthews, "IDA 21 and the Private Sector Window," CGD Notes, June 5, 2024, Accessed at https://www.cgdev.org/publication/ida-21-and-private-sector-window.

[17] OECD DAC, Creditor Reporting System, Mobilized Private Finance for Development, accessed August 2026 at https://data-explorer.oecd.org/?fs[0]=Topic,0%7CDevelopment%23DEV%23&fs[1]=Topic,1%7CDevelopment%23DEV%23%7COfficial%20Development%20Assistance%20%28ODA%29%23DEV_ODA%23&pg=0&fc=Topic&snb=23. The DAC also produces an annual report on mobilized private finance. See Mobilized Private Finance 2026 accessed at https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2026/07/private-finance-mobilisation-report-2026_65d04723/a871a032-en.pdf.

[18] See Eurodad, ActionAid, and CONCORD, "Blended Finance and the Illusion of Development," February 2026, accessed at https://www.eurodad.org/mff_blended_finance_illusion_development; Publish What You Fund, "Is the MDB Joint Report on private capital mobilization report sliding into irrelevance?," June 2026, accessed at https://www.eurodad.org/mff_blended_finance_illusion_development; and Publish What You Fund, "DFI additionality disclosure,: More boxes ticked, but is it value-added?," July 2026, accessed at https://www.publishwhatyoufund.org/2026/07/dfi-additionality-disclosure-more-boxes-ticked-but-is-value-added/?mc_cid=1bdcd8a2af&mc_eid=8a18a09115.

Annex One
OECD DAC Definitions of Core and Multi/Bi Contributions

Core contributions/multilateral ODA: Core contributions to multilateral organizations are resources that are transferred to multilateral organizations and that the governing boards of these organizations have the unqualified right to allocate as they see fit within the limits prescribed by the organization's mandate.

Earmarked/non-core/multi-bi contributions: Earmarked contributions are resources channeled through multilateral organizations over which the donor retains some degree of control on decisions regarding disposal of the funds. Such flows may be earmarked for a specific country, project, region, sector or theme, and they technically qualify as bilateral ODA.

Project-type earmarking: Project-type earmarked contributions are resources strictly earmarked for a specific use, at the project level, leaving no, or limited flexibility to the recipient organization on their allocation. These resources include contributions to project-type interventions (aid type C01 in the DAC CRS list of codes), as well as contributions in terms of donor country personnel (aid type D01) and other technical assistance (aid type D02).

Programmatic earmarking: Programmatically earmarked contributions are resources that are earmarked with a greater degree of flexibility. These resources include contributions to specific-purpose programs and funds managed by implementing partners (aid type B03 in the DAC CRS list of codes), as well as contributions to basket funds/pooled funding (aid type B04).

Source: OECD DAC, *Multilateral Development Finance, 2022*, accessed at https://doi.org/10.1787/9fea4cf2-en.

Annex Two
Provider Earmarking in DAC Multilateral Finance

1. Share of earmarking in total DAC member multilateral finance

Provider	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
Australia	46%	37%	44%	50%	43%	55%	67%	61%	54%	46%
Austria	10%	13%	14%	12%	11%	18%	20%	20%	18%	20%
Belgium	14%	22%	17%	16%	12%	13%	14%	14%	14%	12%
Canada	44%	39%	46%	53%	43%	55%	65%	66%	65%	69%
Denmark	35%	30%	45%	45%	47%	42%	49%	46%	45%	46%
Finland	28%	30%	30%	20%	26%	28%	27%	33%	27%	25%
France	3%	5%	4%	4%	6%	16%	11%	9%	8%	9%
Germany	22%	38%	41%	38%	40%	46%	45%	58%	24%	35%
Ireland	21%	24%	27%	26%	25%	23%	27%	30%	28%	29%
Italy	11%	9%	16%	14%	11%	13%	17%	20%	11%	16%
Japan	36%	32%	32%	25%	21%	34%	33%	48%	46%	50%
Korea	29%	23%	27%	33%	35%	43%	43%	51%	39%	53%
Netherlands	30%	30%	33%	33%	29%	36%	43%	37%	40%	39%
Norway	50%	51%	55%	57%	60%	56%	56%	60%	66%	62%
Spain	7%	6%	8%	6%	6%	7%	20%	22%	12%	15%
Sweden	25%	40%	39%	38%	44%	34%	43%	38%	35%	45%
Switzerland	44%	40%	43%	44%	44%	45%	48%	46%	45%	44%
United Kingdom	33%	35%	33%	34%	41%	33%	23%	36%	24%	51%
United States	57%	51%	58%	62%	64%	56%	50%	69%	81%	72%
Total DAC	33%	34%	36%	36%	38%	39%	39%	49%	44%	46%

Source: DAC Development Cooperation Profiles, chart on Bilateral and Multilateral ODA Allocations, accessed August 2026 at https://www.oecd.org/en/topics/sub-issues/development-co-operation-profiles.html#official-providers.

Annex Three
World Bank's International Development Association (IDA) Three-Year Replenishments
Canada's Contribution, Department of Finance

	Amount Pledged (Millions of US Dollars)	Share of Replenishment	Ranking
IDA 21 2026 to 2028	US$1,198 million ($399M per year)	3.08%	7th
IDA 20 2022 to 2025	US$1,185 million ($395M per year)	3.45%	7th
IDA 19 2021 to 2024	US$1,112 million ($370M per year)	3.45%	7th
IDA 18 2018 to 2021	US$1,039 million ($346M per year)	3.30%	6th
IDA 17 2015 to 2018	US$1,120 million ($373M per year)	3.89%	6th
IDA 16 2012 to 2015	US$1,233 million ($411M per year)	3.89%	6th
IDA 15 2009 to 2012	US$1,082 million ($361M per year)	3.98%	6th

Source: Table A16.1 in Annex 16 of the final report on the IDA replenishment found at https://ida.worldbank.org/en/replenishments.

Notes:

1. Ranked ahead of Canada for IDA 21: China, France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States.

2. "To mitigate the pressures faced by IDA countries, IDA Deputies and Borrower Representatives ("Participants") agreed in February 2021 to significantly increase financial support to IDA countries in FY22 and FY23 by frontloading resources from the nineteenth replenishment of IDA (IDA19) from FY23 to FY22 and truncating the IDA19 implementation period from three to two years. The decision meant that the IDA20 replenishment was advanced by one year to cover the period from July 1, 2022 to June 30, 2025. This shortening of the IDA19 cycle by one year further allowed a carry-over of $11 billion to IDA20."[19]

[19] "Additions to IDA Resources, the Twentieth Replenishment, February 2022, accessed at https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/163861645554924417/pdf/IDA20-Building-Back-Better-from-the-Crisis-Toward-a-Green-Resilient-and-Inclusive-Future.pdf